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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to propose new techniques for robust invisible watermarking of 
digital signals. Firstly, state of the art and existing available software solutions are 
discussed. Then, design of multiple algorithms for invisible watermarking follows, each 
based on different principle. In order to enable benchmarking, suitable digital signals 
dataset is prepared. Also, testing benchmark is introduced, empowering multiple known 
attacks. Each presented solution is then benchmarked, as well as the introduced existing 
available software solutions for invisible watermarking. Results are then compared and 
discussed. 
 
Abstrakt 
Cílem téhle práce je navrhnutí nových technik pro robustní neviditelné značení 
digitálních signálů. Nejdříve je prezentován současný stav tohoto odvětví a dostupné 
softwarové řešení. Poté následuje návrh několika algoritmů pro neviditelné značení, 
přičemž každý z nich je založen na jiném principu. Dále je připravena sada digitálních 
testovacích signálů společně s testovacím softwarem pro otestování navržených řešení a 
jejích porovnání s vybraným dostupným softwarem. Poté následuje srovnání naměřených 
výsledků, výkonu a jejích diskuze. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
While a considerable portion of economics resources is dedicated to the creation of 
intellectual property, the marginal cost of production typically constitutes only a small 
fraction of the creation. However, a creator may expect some measure of compensation 
for the resources expended in the process of creation [1]. This brings the need for 
protection of intellectual property. With rise of the Internet, the traditional forms are no 
longer sufficient, and the need for new techniques arises. 
Past two decades brought rapid changes to the Internet. The development of digital 
technology caused wider availability to end users, together with higher connection 
speeds. Web pages are no longer static and text only – multimedia sharing became a 
common on a daily basis.  Majority of data transmitted through broadband networks is 
composed of multimedia – high resolution digital audio, video and images. In 2014, total 
Internet video traffic was approximately 59.9 exabytes per month, from which video only 
took up 21.6 exabytes per month. This includes short-form Internet video (e.g. Youtube), 
long-form Internet video (e.g. Hulu), live viewing and web based video monitoring. 
However, it excludes P2P video downloads. P2P networks transfers 6.1 exabytes of data 
per month and large portion of this traffic is due to exchange of video files. Predictions 
says, that overall Internet traffic will grow exponentially, with total monthly amount of 
168 exabytes in 2019. Internet video will rise to 89.3 exabytes per month and P2P will 
remain the same [2]. This statistics shows, that users prefers digital media distribution 
over physical carriers like CD and DVD because of its comfort – new data can be acquired 
almost instantaneously, with only short delay compared to traditional distribution 
channels. Also, currently 46 % of all Internet traffic is composed of video, with predicted 
value of 56.7 % in 2019.  
This brings high availability of not only multimedia data itself, but also powerful 
tools for multimedia creating, editing, tampering, copying and transmission, which makes 
it easy to violate intellectual and material rights, even unknowingly. This ease of creation 
of illegal copies makes traditional ownership protection obsolete. Institute for Policy 
Innovation (IPI) estimated, that total loss of multimedia copyright violations in 2005 to 
U.S. economy only was $5.6 billion, excluding loss in United States itself and Western 
Europe [3]. With all that in mind, a need for new techniques for ownership protection and 
authentication arises. 
One possible solution is watermarking of digital signals. It consists of additional 
data embedding in a way, that it is possible to identify or track original author relatively 
easily. Watermarking itself is not new – its origins can be tracked 4000 years back to 
ancient Egypt and Greece, when secret ink was used (e.g. juice of a lemon), which was 
visible only under special conditions. Another used principle was to mark selected 
characters within a document with pinholes, what led to generation of secret pattern. 
However, its current form is present for much shorter period of time – it is related to the 
invention of papermaking in China. It was used intensively from 17th century in America 
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and Europe as a method against books and money counterfeiting [4]. Last evolution of 
watermarks is their digital form. 
Watermarking is suitable method in wide range of applications – whether it is 
tampering detection, proof of origin or fingerprinting. 
1.1 Digital signals watermarking 
Watermarking is application of cryptography technique known as steganography. This 
approach uses principle “security through obscurity” to handle confidentiality. However, 
while cryptology is about protecting the content of message, steganography’s aim is to 
cover the existence of secret message in the first place. Even the word steganography 
itself means “secret writing”.  
Traditionally, user visible part of data is not important, it is used only as a disguise 
for real data. Unauthorized user sees only part, that he has no interest in. However, in 
watermarking, it is other way around. The important part is visible, additional data are 
hidden (e.g. for proving origin or ownership), user has no suspicion that there may be 
some more data hidden.  
Invisible digital watermarking means embedding information into digital content in 
such way, that it is imperceptible to a human observer, but easy to detect by computer 
algorithm [4]. In its essence, it is special pattern of noise signal added to carrier signal. 
Origins of digital watermarking can be traced back to 1982. From this time, the 
interest in this technique is rising every year, due to previously mentioned factors, such 
as rising share of multimedia content on the Internet. This development brought 
emergence of new organizations like CopyProtection Technical WorkingGroup 
(CPTWG) or Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) that specialize on industrialization, 
standardization and evaluation of digital watermarking techniques. It is recognized, that 
digital watermarking is a viable method for protection of ownership rights of multimedia, 
and can be modified to different applications, like digital signatures, fingerprinting, 
publication monitoring and copy control [4]. 
Usage of good watermarking algorithm brings multiple benefits: it is almost 
impossible to detect presence of watermark in data for unaware user and simple data 
modification cannot damage watermark itself. Decryption is yet harder – even that 
unauthorized user managed to somehow get unwatermarked data, the watermark itself 
(difference between watermarked data and carrier data) can still be further encrypted. 
This adds another level of security – privacy. However, when one is able to decrypt 
watermark in any of digital signals set using same embedding algorithm, it is also possible 
to extract watermarks from all remaining data. 
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2 TERMS AND TAXONOMY 
Computer programming is an exact science, thus it enables direct measurement of 
algorithms quality. This requires main quality criteria definition. However, to do so, also 
watermark terminology must be defined.  
2.1 Basic watermarks terminology 
Watermark 
Identifying pattern in data permanently embedded in the host media. Can be as simple as 
a pseudorandom binary sequence. 
Visible watermarks 
Visual patterns in data visible to users (e.g. logos, signatures), whose purpose is, among 
other things, to notify about copyright and prevent appropriation of data.  
Invisible watermarks 
Patterns embedded into carrier signals in a way, that human senses are not able to 
recognize their presence. 
Watermark embedding (watermarking) 
Process of encoding watermark into carrier signal. 
Watermark detection 
Process of uncovering watermark in signal, consisting of multiple steps: extraction, 
decoding and validation. Depending on implementation, it may or may not require 
reference signal. 
Cover data 
Original data used in watermarking process. Also called carrier data. 
Stego data 
Cover data together with watermark after watermarking process is finished. 
Test data 
Data used as an input to watermark detection process. Detector must decide, whether it 
is stego data and watermark can be extracted or not. 
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Reference data 
Data that may be required by watermark detection algorithms. Depending on 
implementation, it can be a cover data, a stego data or a test data. 
2.2 Formal description 
Formally, a watermarking system is described by a tuple: 
 (𝐶, 𝑊, 𝐾, 𝐸𝐾, 𝐷𝐾 , 𝐶𝜏) 2.1 
where 𝐶 is the set of all cover data,  𝑊 is the set of all watermarks, 𝐾 is the set of all keys, 
𝐸𝐾 is the encoder, 𝐷𝐾 is the decoder and 𝐶𝜏 is the comparer function.  
 
From cryptographic point of view, either symmetric or asymmetric key can be used. 
Choosing one over another depends solely on required use case (for further information, 
see Digital watermark applicationssection 3.2).  
The two functions: 
 𝐸𝐾: 𝐶 × W × K → O  2.2 
 
𝐷𝐾: 𝑂 × K → W  2.3 
describe the embedding and detection process, respectively. The comparator function 
 
𝐶𝜏: 𝑊
2 → {0, 1}  2.4 
compares the extracted watermark with really embedded watermark using threshold 𝜏 for 
comparison [1]. 
The input of encoder consist of cover data 𝐶, the watermark 𝑊 and key 𝐾 (see 
Figure 2.1): 
 
𝑆 = 𝐸𝐾(𝑂, 𝑊, 𝐾)  2.5 
where 𝑆 are stego data produced as an output. 
 
In case of decoder, input consist of test data 𝑇, stego data 𝑆 and key 𝐾 (see Figure 
2.2): 
 
𝑊′ = 𝐷𝐾(𝑇, 𝑆, 𝐾)  2.6 
where 𝑊′ is extracted watermark. This generally differ from embedded watermark 𝑊 
because of possible manipulations done to stego data. As a consequence, comparator 
function 𝐶𝜏 is necessary to judge correspondence of watermarks. This achieved by 
comparison of some score function 𝑓 for both inputs against threshold 𝜏: 
 
𝐶𝜏(𝑊
′, 𝑊) = {
1, 𝑓 ≥ 𝜏
0, 𝑓 < 𝜏
  2.7 
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Encoder (E)
Cover 
data (C)
Watermark 
(W)
Key (K)
Output 
(O)
 
Figure 2.1: General watermark encoder. 
Decoder (D)
Test 
data (T)
Stego 
data (S)
Key (K)
Watermark 
(W )
 
Figure 2.2: General watermark decoder. 
Specific implementations of watermarking systems can differ from this general 
definition in terms of required input data (e.g. decoder does not require test data, 
comparison against originally embedded watermark is not required or cryptographic keys 
are not used). 
2.3 Digital watermark requirements 
Watermarks have a few important properties that one needs to understand in order to 
choose implementation suitable for one’s needs. Many of these properties have 
conflicting characteristics, therefore right balance for each application must be found. 
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2.3.1 Robustness 
Watermark ability to withstand common data modifications, like common image 
processing operations (e.g. lossy compression, resizing, trimming, cropping, distortion 
and other common changes made by geometrical transformations). Attack can be 
intentional (cropping, noise insertion) or nonintentional (compression, scaling). The goal 
is to increase probability of error during extraction by interfering with embedded 
watermark, thus increasing false negative rate of watermark detection. However, attacker 
should not be able to gain any information about embedding algorithm [5]. 
Another important thing is, that robustness should not cater for extreme conditions 
– high lossy compression or huge distortions significantly degrading quality are not 
relevant [6], i.e., watermark is robust if it cannot be destroyed without affecting the 
quality of the watermarked object in such a way that it is useless for the application [1]. 
Based on this robustness criterion, three types of watermarks are recognized. Each 
one is suitable for different usage: 
 Robust watermark – designed to withstand both intentional and 
unintentional changes; used for rights management. 
 Fragile watermark – designed to be destroyed by slightest modifications; 
used for changes detection. 
 Semi-fragile – mixture of previous two; designed for specific usage with 
adjusted sensitivity to changes. 
2.3.2 Security 
Security is watermark’s ability to resist malicious attacks aimed at gaining knowledge 
about the embedding and detection keys. Attacker’s aim is to acquire information about 
used algorithms and parameters in order to decode watermarking process and eventually 
to gain ability to forge a watermark. These attack have more severe consequences than 
robustness attacks if successful, because attacker gains ability not to only remove 
watermark, but also to transfer watermark into another data signals [5]. 
 However, in ideal case, Kerckhoffs’s principle [7] should be applied. This means, 
that security depends on the secret key only and not on the obscuration of watermarking 
algorithm. This enables to use standardized algorithms, thus allowing to produce multiple 
software or hardware solutions for decoding/verification, where it is not possible to 
acquire hidden information without secure key. This approach is good for unauthorized 
watermark detection and modification, but does not prevent attacker possibility of 
watermark embedding or collusion removal (averaging of watermark from multiple stego 
images where different key was used) [6]. 
 It should be noted, that secret key can be symmetric or asymmetric, depending on 
application. Also, difference between security and robustness is that while robust 
watermark can survive image processing, it may not be secure against malicious 
tampering [6]. 
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2.3.3 Imperceptibility 
Patterns embedded into carrier signals in a way, that human senses are not able to 
recognize their presence and visual quality of watermarked data is not degraded when 
compared to original data are imperceptible.  
However, evaluation of this criterion by human does not only require huge effort 
and lots of time, but is also subjective. For this reason, multiple automated comparison 
solutions was developed.  
Peak signal to noise ratio 
Most commonly used is peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR) [6]. Consider an 8-bit greyscale 
image. Then: 
 
𝑃𝑆𝑁𝑅 = 20𝑙𝑜𝑔10 (
𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸
) [𝑑𝐵]  2.8 
 
where 𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum level of data value (255 for this case) and 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 is root 
mean square error given by:  
 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 = √
1
𝑀𝑁
∑ ∑[𝑓(𝑚, 𝑛) − 𝑓(𝑚, 𝑛)]
2
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑀
𝑖=1
 [−] 2.9 
where 𝑓(𝑚, 𝑛) is stego image and 𝑓(𝑚, 𝑛) is cover image. 
 
The higher PSNR is, the more similarity is between stego data and cover data. 
However, high perceptual distortion in small fraction of stego data does still produce high 
PSNR values [6]. Therefore, it is generally agreed, that PSNR of 38 dB is acceptable for 
watermarked images (for normal distribution of changes over image, e.g. the noise 
addition, the acceptable PSNR is 30 dB) [8].  
2.3.4 Complexity 
Complexity is the amount of computing resources needed for watermark embedding and 
extraction. It can be measured in processing time for given computer configuration or 
number of required operations. It is recommended to use watermarking algorithms that 
enables multiple different watermarks integration, which prevents “trial and error” forms 
of attacks [4]. 
 It is important to find balance between security, robustness and complexity, based 
on computing environment: mobile devices have a way less available computing power 
and memory than PC and also are limited by finite amount of available energy. Another 
aspect is requirement for smooth user experience – algorithms should be able to work in 
real time and consume only little energy.  
 14 
 
2.3.5 Capacity 
Capacity of watermark express an amount of data in bits embedded into watermark. In 
simplest algorithms it may be equal to one (also named zero-bit in some cases [6]), as 
they only gives Yes/No answer whether watermark in data is present or not. However, to 
fully protect intellectual property, at least 60 bits of data are required (e.g. to store ISBN 
or ISRC codes) [4].  
The capacity of watermark depends beside algorithm also on the size of cover data. 
However, while it may seem that high amount of available data may be sufficient to 
embed a lot of information, another problem arises with quantization – in case of images, 
scaling from high resolution to lower one also lowers amount of image pixels. This may 
attack the watermark and make it undetectable. In order to prevent this, a minimum 
scaling factor that makes image unusable must be estimated. Then, based on this scale 
factor estimation, the maximum watermark capacity can be computed on that minimal 
usable scale. 
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3 STATE OF THE ART 
The invisible watermarking of digital data has been around for a quite long time – more 
than three decades have passed from its beginnings in 1982 [4]. From this time, a 
computers went through rapid development and their computing power have risen 
significantly. This brought data with high resolution to everyday usage. With that change, 
a new formats for digital data storage were developed. However, this changes also 
requires new techniques for invisible watermarking of digital data, because the old ones 
are no longer sufficient. Therefore, some of principles used at digital watermarking 
beginnings are no longer valid and were replaced with new ones. Example of obsolete 
technique is LSB (least significant bit) watermarking, where watermark was embedded 
by slightly changing values of data on predefined positions. Thus, this chapter will present 
current state of the art of the invisible watermarking of digital signals. 
3.1 Watermark detection 
Based on requirements of cover data presence in detector, three types of detection method 
are recognized: 
 Non-blind – presence of original data is required upon detection. 
o Type I – cover data only are required. 
o Type II – cover data and original watermark are required 
 Semi-blind – original watermark is required 
 Blind – presence of cover data is not required upon detection. 
However, blind techniques are more insecure than non-blind methods [4]. 
3.1.1 Detection reliability 
No matter of how robust algorithm one can think of, it is useless, if it is not possible 
reliably detect hidden information. Let’s consider multiple 8-bit RGB JPEG compressed 
images, where some of them are watermarked. Because of the quantization noise, there 
is not an exact yes/no answer to presence of watermark, but range of values (they can be 
thought of as some sort of confidentiality score). When comparing these values with 
actual presence and then plotting graph, two distributions will appear (Figure 3.1). They 
should be far apart, but depending on the quality of watermarking algorithm and the image 
compression ratio, it is possible that they can partially overlap. Therefore, some threshold 
should be defined in order to conclude an answer. Then, four results are possible: 
 Stego image has two possible outcomes: 
o True positive – successful detection of watermark. 
o False positive – unsuccessful detection of watermark. 
 Cover image has two possible outcomes: 
o True negative – absence of watermark. 
o False positive – incorrect detection of watermark as a present. 
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Figure 3.1: Typical distribution of watermark detection values. 
 False positive probability is often used for watermarking algorithm performance 
evaluation. Its value is usually required to be at least 10-5, in some cases even 10-12 [9]. 
False positive rate is coupled with false negative rate. To show their relationship, a graph 
can be plotted, representing ROC curve (Receiver operating characteristic). It represent 
this relationship between this two probabilities and enables to choose optimal models. 
Therefore, threshold should be set according to desired balance. 
The false probability ratio 𝑃𝑓𝑊  of single watermark can be computed as: 
 
𝑃𝑓𝑊 = ∑(0.5)
2 (
𝐿!
𝑟! (𝐿 − 𝑟)!
)
𝐿
𝑟=𝑇
  3.1 
where 𝐿 is the number of bits of watermark, 𝑟 is the number of correctly detected bits and 
𝑇 is the threshold for desired false probability ratio. 
 
This is based on an assumption, that for unwatermarked image, the extracted bits are 
independent random variables with the same probability of success 𝑃𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 0.5 (match 
of extracted bit and watermark bit) [10].  
 However, in case of multiple embedding’s of watermark into single image, it is 
suitable to require multiple correct detections of watermark. In this case, the false 
probability ratio 𝑃𝑓𝐼 can be computed as: 
 
𝑃𝑓𝐼 = ∑(𝑃𝑓𝑊)
𝑖
(1 − 𝑃𝑓𝑊)
𝑀−𝑖
𝑀
𝑟=2
(
𝑀
𝑖
)  3.2 
 
where 𝑀 is the number of watermarks in image and 𝑖 is the number of required detections 
of watermark. 
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 The second possibility is use of error correction codes [11] that enables correction 
of read errors for the price of reduced payload available for user. Their advantage is the 
much lower false probability ratio. An example of error correcting coding is Reed-
Solmon error correction [12]. This approach enables to correct read errors by adding the 
parity bits to the message. The amount of bits that this coding is able to repair is half of 
the parity length. Therefore, in case of 64 bits being embedded, it is possible to use 16 
bits for parity, which enables the correction of up to 8 mismatches and reduces the user 
available space to 48 bits. 
3.2 Digital watermark applications 
Currently, a wide range of digital watermark applications exist. These applications can 
vary significantly in requirements. As mentioned in section 2.3, these requirements are 
often in contradiction and therefore prevent existence of one universal watermarking 
system. Some of major application groups will be discussed below. 
3.2.1 DRM 
DRM (Digital Rights Management) refers to a collection of systems focused on 
management and enforcement of intellectual rights of electronic media. It include digital 
music, movies, books, games and other digital data [13]. DRM controls rights to purchase, 
consume, store, edit and redistribute digital contents. In order to use purchased data, user 
needs to use software which have support for specific DRM solution.  
Creation of this technology was a reaction to high piracy rate of digitally distributed 
data, especially music, movies and games. However, in recent years, users started to be 
outraged, because despite they paid for product, they basically did not owe the copy – 
they were buying only right to use it under specific conditions (e.g. music could be played 
only on specific device, limitation for download count existed, access to media was 
granted only for specific period of time or even permanent internet access to licensing 
server was required). As a result, DRM sopped to be used in some cases (e.g. digital music 
distribution by Apple store started using DRM in 2003 and stopped in 2009 [14]). 
However, in some cases it was only replaced by watermarks (e.g. Amazon Music was 
initially DRM free and without watermarking, however, form 2011 some MP3 files 
contains metadata information in order to identify user or transaction [15]; this 
information in stated in product details). This does not restrict user form usage of bought 
content and at the same time it provides intellectual rights holder a way to trace back user 
who shared content on the internet sharing sites or P2P networks and draw legal 
consequences.  
3.2.2 Copyright protection 
As mentioned in DRM (3.2.1), digital content watermarking enables intellectual rights 
holder way to protect his property. However, copyright protection, in contrast with DRM, 
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does not enforce usage of specialized software in order to read (or use) protected data. 
Intellectual property is in this case enforced only by random search for misuse of 
protected works. Typically, a fingerprinting scheme, where each copy of data is uniquely 
marked is used. This enables identification of rightful copy owners and at the same time 
identification of the leak source – an owner of marked copy that was made publicly 
available in contradiction with copyright license. Such steps enables taking of legal 
actions against copyright violation. 
While this can be achieved by multiple techniques, an invisible watermark is better 
approach, because in contrast to visible tags or additional file properties, it does not 
degrade quality of digital content and it cannot be as easily removed. Therefore, this 
application requires robust watermarks that are able to withstand common data processing 
(e.g. resizing, cropping and lossy compression of images). 
3.2.3 Authentication 
Watermarking enables to check digital signal integrity easily. It is a way to permanently 
embed its identity into data. Therefore, digital signal is authentic, if it is not modified. 
Advantages over common cryptographic hashes and signatures is permanent 
interconnection of data and checksum and no extra space requirements. Also, additional 
information like date and time can be embedded. This enables usage of data as a court 
evidence or in insurance claims (e.g. Secure Digital Camera concept [16]).  
For this application, both fragile and robust watermarks can be used: in case of 
fragile, watermark cannot be detected after modification of data, in case of robust one, 
watermark preserves checksum over modifications. However, fragile watermarks seems 
to be better solution, because of existence of robust watermarks threshold, where 
modification resistance is breached and watermark cannot be successfully detected 
anymore. 
3.2.4 Tamper detection 
Tamper detection’s aim is to disclose changes made to digital signal. The difference from 
authentication (see section 3.2.3) is that tamper detection enables localization of changed 
areas and review severity of changes (see Figure 3.2). This can be useful in media 
forensics or military intelligence, where media must be verifiable to come from legitimate 
source and that they are not changed in any way other than allowed (e.g. compression).  
For this application, fragile and semi-fragile watermarks can be used. However, 
while all three types of watermark detectors can be theoretically used, usage of non-blind 
detector of either type is not always convenient – cover data itself may not be available 
on the side of receiver, as they itself are transmitted over secure channel. 
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Figure 3.2: Example tamper detection using fragile watermark [17]: a) watermarked image, b) tampered image, c) 
detected watermark in tampered image. 
3.2.5 Content archiving and privacy control 
Closely related to authentication (section 3.2.3) is archiving of personal data. For 
example, medical images can contain patient details. Sensitive information are then not 
available in human readable form and privacy is then implicitly ensured. Usage of fragile 
watermark is preferred, because in case of archiving, no malicious changes can be made 
to data. 
Another possible application is image archive. This does not require usage of classic 
database for images storing. Database is only used as an index storage. Data for indexing 
(e.g. keywords) are then retrieved directly from image (from its watermark). This 
prevents unintended changes of information associated with particular image. This 
application does not require robust watermark, but rather reversible watermark. In other 
words, removing of watermark form stego data should produce cover data. 
3.2.6 Broadcast monitoring 
Broadcast monitoring enables automatic computer monitoring of television and radio 
broadcast to track appearance of distributed material. Because of relatively controlled 
environment, where broadcasters does not modify data beyond broadcast compression, 
this can be seen as one of easier applications of watermarking. Several such system exists 
for nearly two decades (e.g. MusiCode, 1998 or VIVA, 1997) [4].  
This enables multiple usages: advertising agencies can use watermarks for 
verification, that TV or radio advertisement was really broadcasted during time that they 
paid for. In case of production companies, the aim is to prevent and detect illegal 
rebroadcasting of protected work. In case of TV broadcast, both audio and video can be 
watermarked for such purpose.  
3.2.7 Device control 
Devices receiving signals (e.g. radio stations, TVs or signal repeaters) can be controlled 
remotely in similar way as in broadcast monitoring (section 3.2.6). These devices can 
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recognize different watermarks in signal and then execute commands or even update their 
software [4]. However, main disadvantage of this application is only one way 
communication. This form of communication is convenient in cases, where these devices 
are located in remote or hard to reach locations, only small amount of data is needed and 
usage of other networks would be too pricey.  
Another similar usage is control of access to TV and radio stations: User buys a 
decoder and optionally subscription to premium channels. This subscription is then linked 
to the unique hardware ID. The list of authorized hardware IDs is then transmitted in 
cycle together with broadcasted data. Decoder analyzes this signal and decides, whether 
it can proceed with decoding.  
3.3 Robust watermarks 
As mentioned in previous section (3.2), robust watermarks have many applications. The 
main key to competing robust watermarking algorithm is, as the name itself states, 
robustness. This means watermark data must resist modification of data at least until 
point, where severity of modification makes carrier data unusable. These modifications 
are referred as an attacks, regardless of their intentionality. Below, classification robust 
watermark attacks will be presented. However, in real scenarios, combinations of these 
attack will be used. 
3.3.1 Removal attacks 
Removal attacks aims at complete removal of watermark from cover data. For robust 
watermark, this operation should be either unsuccessful or result into severe degradation 
of digital signal quality (data should not be usable anymore). Compared to visible 
copyright information like header or statement, watermarking is better solution, because 
attack is a way more difficult and attacker has no visual feedback of what is attacking. 
Denoising and lossy compression 
This approach engages the idea, that the watermark is artificially added noise, which can 
be modelled statistically and therefore it is possible to remove it. Attack consists of 
estimation of cover data from stego data. This class of attack is quite wide and well 
explored – denoising and compression have been extensively studied in literature 
concerning image enhancements and coding. 
One of possible approaches is signal denoising, where multiple methods exists: a 
maximum likelihood (ML), a maximum aposeriori probability (MAP), a minimum mean 
square error (MMSE) or a minmax criteria. For each method, a wide variety of algorithms 
exists: e.g. local mean, median, trimmed median, Gaussian and Laplacian estimates in 
case of ML or Wiener filter and soft and hard shrinkage in case of MAP [8].  
Lossy compression based on wavelet transformations exploit both intrascale (e.g. 
embedded zerotree wavelet (EZV)) and interscale (e.g. EQ coder) redundancy of image 
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data. This process is very similar to denoising. It works by giving the closest estimate to 
the cover image in compressed form [8]. 
Remodulation 
Remodulation attack class is relatively new and not as extensively studied as Denoising 
and lossy compression. In this case, watermark can be predicted by removing of median 
filtered version of stego data from stego data itself. Predicted watermark can be further 
modified afterwards: high-pass filtered and truncated. Final step consist of removing this 
prediction from stego data, which leads to creation of cover data estimate. However, this 
approach does not accurately estimates lower frequencies, because of median filter, which 
influences mostly high frequencies in data. Therefore, it can be successfully used only on 
watermarks based on high frequencies. In real scenarios, its performance is poor, because 
watermarks statistics are matched with data in order to achieve imperceptibility [8]. 
Another example is Wiener attack consisting of two steps: watermark prediction 
based on Wiener filter and subtraction of estimate watermark from stego data with 
strength factor determined from minimization of cross-correlation coefficient. However, 
this attack produces good results only in case when watermark’s strength is same in all 
data. Resistance against this attack is to make watermark estimation hard – watermark’s 
power spectrum should look like power spectrum of cover data [8]. 
Reduction of signal to noise ratio is also possible: additive white Gaussian noise 
destroys watermark by increasing of the noise variance. However, amount of added noise 
is limited by some measure of allowable visual data distortions. Practical attack are 
therefore limited [8]. 
Averaging, collusion and mosaic 
Averaging attack can be used in case of fingerprinting – it requires a set of stego data, 
each originating from same cover data, but containing different watermark embedded by 
same principle. If the dataset is large enough, computing average data should make 
embedded watermark undetectable. 
Collusion attack uses the same dataset of stego data and creates attacked data by 
rebuilding it from small data fragments from dataset [8]. 
Another attack similar to averaging and collusion is mosaic attack [8]. It is used on 
pictures by some websites. This principle does not try to remove the watermark, but rather 
split image in parts such small, that it is no longer possible do detect watermark. These 
parts are then composed by means of HTML (hypertext markup language) in a way, that 
humans do not notice splitting of original image.  
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3.3.2 Geometrical attacks 
Geometrical attacks does not aim at watermark removal, but rather to distort it by spatial 
or temporal modifications to the stego data. Due to these changes, detector is unable to 
detect embedded watermark. 
For spatial domain attacking, an effective attack is pixel jittering [8]. This consist 
of placing pixels randomly off the grid and then calculating the new grid values by one 
of the scaling methods (e.g. a nearest-neighbor interpolation, a bilinear interpolation or 
bicubic interpolation). Resistance to this attack is problematic, because human visual 
system is not sensitive against slight data modifications. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Example of pixel jittering attack. 
This class of attack also includes global distortions generated by affine 
transformations like rotation, scaling, change of aspect ratio, translation and shearing. 
Also skipping of samples or cropping of data is part of this attack family. Robustness to 
these operation can be achieved by a transform invariant domain, an additional template, 
or an autocorrelation function. Resistance to these attacks is currently considered to be 
solved issue [8]. 
3.3.3 Cryptographic attacks  
These attacks are aimed at already extracted watermarks that are further encrypted. 
Besides exploiting of vulnerabilities of used cryptographic algorithms, also brute force 
attack are possible. They use extensive searching through key space in order to find 
correct key. Multiple modifications of this process are available, like precalculation of 
values or Oracle attack when watermark detector is present [8]. 
Therefore, a key of sufficient strength must be used in order to eliminate possibility 
of brute force attack. According to NIST (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology), a minimal key strength considered to be safe until year 2030 is 112 bits 
[18]. However, with quantum computing in mind key strength of 256 bits is 
recommended. 
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3.3.4 Protocol attacks 
These attacks aims at attacking the concept of watermarking application itself. In case of 
invertible watermark, an inversion attack can be performed. It consist of subtracting 
attacker’s watermark from stego data. This enables attacker to claim, that stego data 
contains also his watermark [8]. As a result, real ownership of data became ambiguous. 
Therefore, in case of copyright protection scenario, a non-invertible watermark should be 
used. 
Another attack of this class is copy attack. It is similar to remodulation (section 
3.3.1), but uses prediction of watermark from cover data. Prediction is then modified to 
satisfy condition of imperceptibility when merged with cover data. This process does not 
require knowledge of watermarking algorithm nor the used watermarking key [8]. 
3.4 Approaches to robust watermarking 
Because the multiple classes of attacks with different characteristics exists, it is difficult, 
if not even impossible to design robust watermarking scheme that can withstand 
malicious tampering of all kinds. As a result, multiple types of approaches exists, based 
on different principles and designed to resist different attacks. However, resistance to one 
class of attacks often brings disadvantages as predisposition to another class of attacks or 
worse properties in terms of usage or computational cost. As a consequence, hybrid 
techniques emerged, combining the best of all. However, in case of some attacks, this is 
still not enough and further research must be conducted.  
Because of all this, the specification of usage must be defined first in order to 
develop a watermarking technique fulfilling all requirements. 
3.4.1 Redundant information 
Redundant embedding of watermark into image is one of many possible ways to achieve 
robustness against some attacks from geometrical attacks class (e.g. cropping, scaling, 
and jittering). This method is block based, as input signal is divided into non-overlapping 
parts, and into each one the same watermark is embedded. Blocks itself can have different 
sizes and does not require to be distributed equally over the data or cover all areas [1]. 
The choice of areas for watermark embedding can be predefined or content-aware. 
The first method requires less compute power, as no search for suitable areas is required. 
However, in case the data contains only low frequencies in predefined areas, visual 
imperceptibility is hard to achieve. Another problem of this approach is low security, as 
all images are watermarked in the same areas, which are secured only by obscurity. Partial 
solution to this problem is usage of secret key to define those areas. However, then it does 
prevent some applications of this technique, like content protection, because user cannot 
validate copyright of the image. The second solution – with search for suitable areas for 
embedding is better in terms of both security and visual imperceptibility, as it uses content 
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of data to select best areas for watermark embedding. However, this approach has higher 
computational demands and also same problem with security by obscurity, when selection 
of watermarking areas for embedding areas depends only on the algorithm 
implementation. This problem can be also fixed by encryption, with same consequences 
as in previous case. 
3.4.2 Synchronization 
Synchronization is similar to redundant information (section 3.4.1) in terms of embedding 
area selection. However, in this approach, only one watermark is embedded. The selected 
area can be of any arbitrary shape (exact shape depends on the implemented algorithm). 
Selection of the area itself is based on robust features detection (e.g. robust corners or 
robust moments). This approach has great robustness against most attacks from geometry 
attacks class. Furthermore, robustness against compression, contrast and brightness 
manipulation is also higher than in case of redundant information. However, cropping 
attack is problematic, as it can lead into removal of significant feature used for 
synchronization and therefore unsuccessful watermark detection. Another problem of this 
approach is dependency on data content – data must contain enough of robust features in 
order to enable watermark embedding and decoding [4]. 
This class of watermarking approaches also contains methods that besides 
embedding of the watermark itself also embeds synchronization template. However, 
several problems arises with this approach: because of need for two watermarks 
embedding, quality of stego data can by significantly degraded to the limit of 
imperceptibility. Also, this synchronization template creates visible peaks in frequency 
domain of data and therefore can be relatively easily removed. This will prevent 
synchronization in detector and disallow further watermark detection. Another problem 
of this approach is reduction of available capacity, as both watermark and template are 
inserted into data. The possible solution to part of this problem is combination of 
synchronization template and watermark itself into new watermark. However, this 
approach is still not robust against synchronization template removal [1] [6]. 
3.4.3 Invariant domain 
Approaches based on invariant domain rely on the invariant properties of the transformed 
domain (frequency domain in most cases). They do not need synchronization, as only 
predefined frequencies are used. Because of the nature of the transformed domain, these 
methods are independent of the image features and inherently robust against geometrical 
attacks [6]. The imperceptibility of watermarks is achieved by modification of middle 
frequencies. Low frequencies are not used, as human visual system (HVS) is sensitive to 
changes in low frequencies and insensitive to changes in high frequencies. However, 
watermark embedding into high frequencies is not suitable, as those are easily corrupted 
by geometrical attacks or even slight changes in brightness and contrast. Therefore, 
middle frequencies are chosen as a compromise between these two extremes. 
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One of subclasses of invariant domain approach is based on the discrete cosine 
transform (DCT). This is due to high usage of lossy compression of images based on DCT 
(JPEG compression). Exploiting usage of DCT enables to overcome loss of data due to 
compression and therefore creating a robust watermarking solution [1]. Image is divided 
into blocks of 8 × 8 pixels. Blocks for watermark embedding are then pseudorandomly 
chosen and then converted into DCT domain. After that, based on a secret key, DCT 
coefficient pairs are selected and changed [1]. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Example of 3 level DWT*: subimage in top left corner contains intensity image of 1/16 of original 
resolution, other subimages contains details. An original image can be reconstructed from this decomposition. 
* image has inverted colors in order to better visualize information of each subimage. 
Another subclass is based on the discrete wavelet transform (DWT). This is 
similarly to DCT subclass chosen among other reasons for its use in image codec JPEG 
2000. Typically, a 3 level DWT decomposition is used (see Figure 3.4). This 
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decomposition contains both spatial and frequency description of the image, which 
enables multi-resolution analysis at different resolutions and frequencies [19].  
The other possible approaches in this class involves usage of discrete Fourier 
transform (DFT) and combination or modification of DWT, DCT and DFT. 
3.4.4 Hybrid methods 
Because the robustness of previous techniques is not good enough, a multiple hybrid 
methods combining these approaches was developed. As an example, a methods 
combining synchronization with redundant information exists: Firstly, a good feature 
points are selected as a reference points. Then, multiple areas are created from these 
feature points. Into each area, a watermark is then embedded in spatial domain. Because 
the shape of the areas is not defined, an interpolation to some defined shape is needed in 
order to successfully embed and decode watermark. A suitable shape can be triangle, as 
it enables fast net computation from feature points and easy transformation into right-
angled isosceles triangle. This approach can be further enhances by usage transform 
domain for watermark embedding [20]. 
Another example of hybrid method is predicting of possible distortions at the 
watermark embedding stage. A set of watermark distorted inversely to predicted 
distortions is generated. This ensures, that after the distortion of the data in predicted way, 
distortion of watermark will be cancelled out and the detector will detect original 
watermark. After set of distorted watermarks is generated, an iteratively process of 
embedding begins. Each watermark is embedded into carrier signal. However, problem 
with this approach is possible difficulty to make changes imperceptible. Also, the 
computational cost can be too high for some devices [6]. 
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4 EXISTING AVAILABLE SOLUTIONS 
Currently, multiple applications for watermarking are publicly available on the internet. 
However, their properties differ widely – they exists in both free and paid versions, their 
ease of use and robustness is different and some of them offer additional services like 
automatic web crawlers searching for unlicensed content. Presented solutions are selected 
by using first few results from phrase “invisible watermarking software” on google.com. 
4.1 Digital image watermarking 
A number of tools for image watermarking exist. A few of them will be briefly presented 
in this chapter. At the end, a summary table of their declared properties will be presented. 
However, their real performance will be evaluated later together with proposed 
algorithms. 
4.1.1 SignMyImage 
SignMyImage is image signing tool by AdvancedPhotoTools [21]. Currently, it is not in 
active development and the latest version 4.26 is from March 2013. Both freeware and 
payed version exists, but free version is restricted by license to be used for copyright and 
property rights protection and also produces visible watermark in right bottom corner of 
image. This tool is available as a standalone application for Windows, Mac OS X and 
Linux, both with GUI and command line interface, all with support for batch processing. 
Also, plugin for Adobe Photoshop and SDK exists. Developer claims, that this 
watermarking process is robust against cropping, scaling and JPEG compression. 
Watermark itself can consist from up to 10 alphanumerical ASCII characters (60 bit long 
watermarks are being embedded). 
SignMyImage uses blind watermark detection and protect already signed images 
by disallowing another signing when watermark presence is detected (no unique key is 
used). The paid version also supports Image Spider – a web crawler that searches through 
interned for signed images. In case, that signed image is found, an owner (person who 
signed image) is notified by email. Crawling can occur in two modes – random or custom. 
Custom mode enables user to define URLs for periodic crawling. 
The embedding itself works by modification to blue channel – a three channel 24bit 
RGB image is required as output. In case of different input, automatic conversion occurs. 
Robustness against cropping is achieved by using multiple regions to embed the same 
watermark. This regions are shown to user during embedding. However, a minimal 
number of embedding regions is not defined and their selection is fully automatic. 
Therefore, a signed image with only one output can be produced, which greatly reduces 
resistance against cropping. Another disadvantage of this approach is possible 
perceptibility of image change in images with high portion of blue color. Also, 
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watermarking of grayscale images is not secure, as attacker can clearly see and remove 
modifications in blue channel (green and red channel have the same values). 
4.1.2 Icemark 
Icemark is created by Phibit software [22]. Like SignMyImage, it is also not in active 
development. Latest available version 1.4 is from September 2013. Both free and payed 
versions are available for Windows and Mac OS X with GUI. Freeware version produces 
visible watermark in bottom side of image. A batch processing is supported by menu item 
in GUI. Developer claims, that watermarking is robust against cropping, scaling, jpeg 
compression and geometric distortions.  
Tree modes of watermark itself exists: 
 Text: 28 alphanumeric ASCII characters long (196 bit)  
 Image ID: an identification number from 0 to 4 294 967 296 (32 bit integer 
number) with possibility of additional 3 flags:  
o Restricted use 
o Do not copy 
o Adult content 
 Identification: watermark based on key will be embedded. 
Algorithm uses semi-blind detection and requires key – during extraction, same key 
as in embedding process must be used to successfully retrieve embedded watermark. Key 
can be 256 alphanumeric ASCII characters long. For detection, also a correct mode must 
be selected. Another important property is watermark intensity. This setting influences 
the imperceptibility of watermark in stego image. It can range from 1 to 100 with default 
(optimal) value of 50. 
4.1.3 Digimarc Guardian for Images 
Digimarc Guardian for Images is a plugin for Adobe Photoshop from company Digimarc 
[23]. It is distributed as a part of standard Photoshop installation from version CS6. For 
previous versions, free download is available. Its functionality is basically a combination 
of SignMyImage and Icemark: three modes of watermark itself exists: 
 Copyrights years: year between 1826 and current year, or range in-between 
 Image ID: an identification number from 1 to 4 294 967 296 (32 bit integer 
number) 
 Transaction ID: an identification number from 1 to 4 294 967 296 (32 bit integer 
number) 
Each mode can set additional flags: 
 Restricted use 
 Do not copy 
 Adult content 
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Additionally, a user can choose a watermark robustness level between 1 and 4, where 
higher lever produces more robust watermark, but it may make changes, that are 
perceptible when compared to original image. 
In case of payed version, an online web crawler for copyright violation is available. 
User then has access to website with results of search. This license assigns a unique key 
that cannot be changed to each user. This key is then used during watermarking process. 
Payed version restrict number of images in database of crawler based on the license to 
1000 or 2000 per year. 
Watermark extraction does not need to specify used embedding mode – it is 
extracted automatically. The confidentiality of watermark presence is expressed by score 
of low, medium or high. Unfortunately, information about used algorithm, its 
performance or robustness are not available. 
4.1.4 OpenStego 
OpenStego is opensource and free steganography solution developed by Samir Vaidya 
[24]. Current stable version is 0.6.1 from April 2014. Two operational modes exists – 
besides watermarking (which is in beta state), it is also a data hiding (any data can be 
hidden into any cover data). Application is written in Java and therefore available for 
Windows, Mac OS X and Linux with same executable. Both GUI and command line are 
supported and batch processing is also available in both. 
Watermarking is implemented using Dugad’s algorithm [25] and does not have any 
configuration options beside user defined passphrase for signature file generation. This 
file is then used for watermark embedding and detection. Watermark detection process 
returns confidentiality score in %, that the signature is embedded in the image. As of 
algorithm itself, a three level DWT with Daubechie’s 8-tap filter is used. Then, all 
coefficients above given threshold are picked and watermark is added to them (image size 
watermark is used). This approach is robust against cropping, jpeg compression, Gaussian 
noise and median filtration. 
4.1.5 Summary 
While multiple software solutions for image content protection exists, their features differ 
radically. However, what is the most concerning, only one of presented solutions exactly 
defined robustness of algorithm. Because the group of people interested in this kind of 
protection consists mostly from professional photographers, they should require at least 
basic definition of robustness against the most common attacks for their own sake. 
As of direct comparison of products (see Table 4.1) itself, they are all very similar. 
However, online crawler can be considered as a big advantage for professional 
photographers, as it provides a convenient way for searching of copyright abuse. On the 
other hand, fixed key is a major disadvantage in some cases, as it does enable anyone to 
read hidden information. 
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Table 4.1: Comparison of software for image watermarking. 
 
SignMyImage Icemark 
Digimarc 
Guardian OpenStego 
Supported 
types 
JPEG, BMP, 
PNG, TIFF 
JPEG, BMP, 
PNG, TIFF, PSD, 
GIF, 
JPEG, BMP, 
PNG, TIFF, PSD, 
GIF, JPEG 2000, 
JPEG, PCX, 
RAW 
JPEG, BMP, 
PNG,  TIFF, 
WBMP 
Robustness 
cropping, JPEG 
compression, 
scaling 
cropping, JPEG 
compression, 
scaling, 
geometric 
distortions 
not provided 
cropping, JPEG 
compression, 
Gaussian noise, 
median filtration 
Watermark 
length 
60 bit 196 bit 32bit not provided 
Detection 
mode 
Blind Semi-blind Semi-blind Semi-blind 
Key Fixed User defined Fixed, per user User defined 
Price Free / $16.50 Free / $49.95 
Free / $49.00 / 
$99.00 
Free 
Pros 
 Price 
 Web crawler 
 Robustness 
 Custom key 
 Format 
support 
 Web crawler 
 Price 
 Custom key 
Cons 
 Fixed key 
 10 characters 
watermark 
 High price 
for no web 
crawler 
 Fixed key 
 No batch 
processing 
 Difficult 
usage for 
fingerprinting 
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5 WATERMARKING ALGORITHMS 
The aim of this thesis is to propose multiple robust invisible watermarking algorithms 
suitable for intellectual rights and copyright protection of digital images. This is a reaction 
to professional photographers’ needs, whose intellectual rights are being persistently 
violated all over the internet, often even unwittingly. To successfully solve this issues, a 
suitable publicly available watermarking software and global database of protected works 
accessible worldwide through web is one of possible solutions. While it might not cover 
all cases of copyright abuse, it can reduce it by enabling anyone to freely check, that the 
image he/she wants to use is not intellectually protected and/or get information about used 
protection and eventually purchase required work.  
This brings requirements for watermarking algorithm – high robustness against 
compression, cropping, scaling and geometrical transformations as well as noise adding 
and noise filtration. Also a robustness against digital to analog and backward analog to 
digital conversion is suitable, as it preserves embedded watermark even in printed images 
– copyright can be easily verified by photographing protected image or even showing it 
to webcam or smartphone. High security in order to prevent attacker to remove watermark 
is also required. Therefore, a solution that cannot be attacked by statistical means is 
required. 
However, direct selling over internet has additional requirement – fingerprinting of 
transactions, as with higher spread of specific work a probability of copyright also rises 
(e.g. buyer makes purchased work freely available on the internet). This enables 
subsequent identification of responsible person and possibility to undertake legal actions 
to enforce intellectual rights. To enable unique identification, an identifier should be at 
least 64 bites long, thus minimal requirement for capacity arises. 
For this purpose, a creation of web service, whose does not only provide a database 
of protected digital works, but also enables an automatic and active web searching of the 
internet with the aim to find copyright violation and provide original authors a way to 
enforce their intellectual rights is suitable.  
However, this all brings another requirements for used watermarking algorithm – 
low complexity in terms of required compute power in order to speed up searching 
process. The use of asymmetric encryption in order to enable public reading of hidden 
information, but prevent its forging would be ideal. Further, this issue can be resolved by 
use of symmetric encryption only: the user would upload image in question to checking 
server, who would then check for watermark. Also, a blind or semi-blind detection is 
required in order to search through unknown images. 
Therefore, an ideal watermarking algorithm should have following properties: 
 Robustness against: 
o JPEG compression 
o cropping 
o scaling 
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o geometrical distortions 
o noise filtration 
o noise addition  
 Security against malicious tampering 
 Capacity of at least 64 bits. 
 Cryptographically protected watermark data 
 Low complexity in terms of required compute power 
 Making imperceptible changes 
 Blind or semi-blind detection 
5.1 Geometrically invariant tessellated feature points 
One of possible solutions to fulfill defined requirements is use of geometrically invariant 
feature points [20]. This method is a member of the content-aware invisible watermarking 
algorithms class and uses self-synchronization to determine watermark location. Because 
of its content awareness, these reference points are randomly distributed over the image 
(depends on image content itself; their alteration causes severe degradation of image) and 
therefore template removing attack is impossible. This properties can be exploited by 
using Delaunay tessellation [26], which produces a triangular net. Then, in each triangle, 
a watermark can be embedded using interpolation. This process creates redundancy in 
order to improve robustness. 
5.1.1 Watermark embedding 
Watermark embedding consists of four steps: 
 Feature points detection and filtration 
 Local characteristic regions selection 
 Watermark generation 
 Watermark embedding 
The complete flowchart of the proposed algorithm can be found in Figure 5.7 at the end 
of this section.  
Feature points detection 
The requirements of feature point’s detector are to find the same feature points repeatedly, 
even when point of view on image is changed (geometrical distortion is introduced), 
detection must be fast and sufficient number of them must be found.  
Currently, a multiple classes of feature points detector exists: edge detectors, corner 
detectors, blob detectors, ridge detectors, Hough transform and others. However, for this 
application, corner detectors category is suitable, as it directly produces exact points of 
interest. It consists of multiple detectors (e.g. Moravec, Harris, SUSAN, FAST and 
others). Based on the comparison of performance and repeatability of corner detectors in 
[27], an enhanced version of FAST (features from accelerated segment text) [27] was 
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chosen as appropriate robust feature points detector. The original FAST detector classifies 
point 𝑝 as a corner, if a set of 𝑛 continuous pixels brighter than 𝐼𝑝 exists in the circle with 
diameter 𝑑 around the point 𝑝. A 𝑑 = 3 is typically used, producing 12 pixels to examine, 
as this is the best compromise between speed and accuracy, as it enables quick test using 
only four pixels to exclude area from candidate pixels.  
 
             
             
     16 1 2      
   15      3    
             
  14        4   
  13    p    5   
  12        6   
             
   11      7    
     10 9 8      
             
             
Figure 5.1: FAST detector: red - examined point, green - test points 
However, it has following issues: 
 Bad test generalization for 𝑛 < 12 
 Implicit assumptions about the distribution of feature appearance are required 
 Quick test results are discarded 
 Multiple features can be adjacent one to another 
In order to solve this issues, firstly corners on a test set of images are detected by 
standard FAST. Then, for each corner, all test pixels are assigned into one of three 
categories using threshold 𝑡 to differentiate intensity values: 
 
𝑆𝑝→𝑥 = {
𝑑, 𝐼𝑝→𝑥 ≤ 𝐼𝑝 − 𝑡
𝑠, 𝐼𝑝 − 𝑡 < 𝐼𝑝→𝑥 < 𝐼𝑝 + 𝑡
𝑏, 𝐼𝑝 + 𝑡 ≤ 𝐼𝑝→𝑥
 
(darker) 
(similar) 
(brighter) 
5.1 
where 𝐼 denotes intensity value of the point being examined, 𝑥 ∈ {1. .16} denotes all 
location on the circle (test points), 𝑝 → 𝑥 denotes relation of test pixel to examined pixel 
𝑝, 𝑡 denotes the required threshold difference and 𝑆 denotes resulting state of test pixel. 
After that, a decision tree is created using ID3 learning algorithm [28]. Then, 
recursive process of selecting 𝑥, which yields most information whether the candidate 
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pixel is corner starts. This is measured by entropy (detailed explanation can be found in 
[27]). When learning of the decision tree is complete, it is then compiled and ready for 
use. This approach enables generation of efficient detector for 𝑛 = 9, which is the most 
reliable of the FAST detectors. Detailed comparison in [27] shows, that this optimization 
brings 50% speedup of corner detection.  
As of reliability and repeatability when compared to the other detectors (Harris, 
Harris-Laplace, Shi & Tomasi, DoG, original FAST, FAST 9, FAST 12 and SUSAN), a 
test was performed utilizing different views of the same object. This test used strong 
changes of perspective, scale and radial distortion. Comparison of alignment of same 
points between two images was made by image warping. Multiple datasets with different 
properties were used. FAST 9 outperformed all of other methods in case of repeatability 
on all datasets, except additive noise, when noise of 𝜎 > 10 caused rapid fall of FAST 9 
reliability. Comparison graphs can be found in APPENDIX A: Comparison of corner 
detectors. 
The feature points detection itself is performed on grayscale image. Color images 
are converted using luminosity equation (see 5.2). However, because the input image can 
be noised or contain high count of weak corners, this can lead into high count feature 
points. 
 𝐼𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑦 = 0.21𝐼𝑟 + 0.72𝐼𝑔 + 0.07𝐼𝑏  5.2 
where 𝐼𝑥 are the individual color channels of image 
 
In order to solve this issue, an additional filtering selecting best feature point in the 
area is performed: 
Next, filtration of detected feature points follows. This step is necessary because 
the feature points returned by the FAST detector are not equally distributed around image. 
However, because the following step – local characteristic regions selection – requires 
creation of regions of some minimal size (the region size smaller than certain threshold 
would not enable successful detection of embedded information), transparent selection of 
detected feature points is performed: 
1. Feature points are ordered descending by their response value. 
2. Best feature point is selected as a starting point 
3. Selected point is tested to be inside image and outside of defined distance 𝑑. 
4. If condition in item 3. is fulfilled, point is added into filtered set of points 
5. Next best point is selected and process continues by item 3 until no more points 
exists. 
The required distance of points is based on the resolution of input image, this 
ensures that same feature points are detected for various scales of image: 
 
𝑑 =
√𝑤 × ℎ
𝛾
   5.3 
Where 𝑤 is the width of image, ℎ is the height of the image and 𝛾 is the correction factor. 
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For this method, correction factor is set to the value 𝛾 = 30. This filtration results 
into set of feature points 𝑃 regularly distributed across image. The filtration results are 
illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.2: Results of feature points filtration: a) output of FAST detector, b) filtration using equation 5.3. 
Local characteristic regions selection 
In order to create a network between feature points, a Delaunay tessellation over the set 
of features points 𝑃 is employed. The Delaunay tessellation of the set 𝑃 is defined as a 
unique triangulation of the convex cover of 𝑃 such as the interior of the containing circle 
𝐶 if each triangle 𝑇𝑘 ∈ 𝑇 does not contain another vertex 𝑉(𝑣1, 𝑣2, 𝑣3), 𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝑃 of 𝑃. This 
produces an image decomposed into set of disjoint triangles 𝑇, which can be considered 
to be local characteristic regions (LCRs).  
The choice of this method is determined by its properties [26]: 
 Tessellation is inherently deterministic 
 Computational cost is low 
 Local vertex disappearing modifies only connected triangles, other remains 
intact 
 Each vertex has a stability area, which ensures that slight changes in vertex 
(feature) position does produce the same triangle; therefore, tessellation is 
not modified 
This ensures, that the generated triangles contains the same LCRs even after affine 
transformations are performed on the original image (this is based on assumption, that the 
same feature points in previous step are also detected). Therefore, watermark detection is 
possible even for attacks like shearing, scaling or rotating. 
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Figure 5.3: Example of Delaunay tessellation: set of feature points (red dots) and resulting triangulation (white 
lines). 
Watermark generation 
Watermark 𝑇𝑤 is generated from a secret key 𝐾 using one-way hashing function. Its 
output is a 120 bits long pseudorandom binary sequence. It is then then fitted onto 128 ×
128 𝑝𝑥 big, right-angled isosceles triangle. Each positive bit in sequence is spread to 6 ×
6 block. Zero bits are not considered, as their presence does not change resulting 
watermark (see Figure 5.4). This improves robustness against feature points positioning 
errors, triangles interpolations to right-angled isosceles triangles and geometrical attacks.  
 
 
Figure 5.4: Example of generated watermark. 
Watermark embedding 
In order to embed watermark into each triangle, an affine transform from generated 
watermark to triangle in image must be computed. The affine transform is oriented using 
the magnitude of each triangle’s side issued from 𝑇𝑘 ∈ 𝑇. This is achieved by computing 
the angle between the longest side of the triangle and the horizontal plane. The point of 
their cross-section is the point of cross-section of triangle’s two longest sides. Then, 
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generated watermark 𝑇𝑤 is transformed into 𝑇𝑡 using spline-cubic interpolation to 
preserve high frequencies. The result of this operation can be seen in Figure 5.5a. 
The final step is to add transformed watermark 𝑇𝑡 into image. However, because of 
the human visual system sensitivity to slight changes in contrast in middle luminance 
areas, a psychovisual weighting of watermark by mask Λ is required: 
 𝑇𝑝 = Λ(𝑖,𝑗) × 𝑇𝑡(𝑖,𝑗)  5.4 
and 
 
Λ(𝑖,𝑗) =
T𝑘(𝑖,𝑗)
(
𝑏
2)
2 × 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣(𝑇𝑘)(𝑖,𝑗) × 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ  5.5 
where (𝑖, 𝑗) is the pixel in image, 𝑏 is the maximum value of pixel (255 in case of 8-bit 
images), 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣(𝐼) is the standard deviation of image 𝐼 and 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ is the user defined 
strength factor.  
 
The result of this operation can be seen in Figure 5.5b: the grey area around dark triangle 
represents zero value. The dark area in triangle represents −𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ value and bright 
areas inside triangle represents visually weighted positive bits of transformed watermark 
from Figure 5.5a. 
  
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.5: Transformed watermark (a) and weighted watermark (b). 
After this step, watermark values are added to the corresponding area in cover 
image: 
 𝑇𝑘 = 𝑇𝑘 + 𝑇𝑝  5.6 
5.1.2 Watermark detection  
The watermark detection process starts with first three steps of embedding process: 
feature detection producing set of feature points 𝑃, triangular image tessellation 
producing set of disjoint triangles 𝑇 and watermark 𝑇𝑤 generation from a secret key. 
Then, for each triangle, an affine transform from triangle 𝑇𝑘 ∈ 𝑇 to generated watermark 
𝑇𝑤 is computed. Each triangle is then transformed into 𝑇∟ of size 128 × 128 𝑝𝑥 using 
opposite transformation to the watermark transformation used during embedding. 
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Likewise in embedding process, the spline-cubic interpolation is used in order to preserve 
edges during transformation. 
 The next step is separation of watermark from stego data. This is achieved using 
statistic of a standard deviation 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣(𝐼) of 𝑇∟ (see Figure 5.6a): each possible bit 
location (8 × 8 blocks) is correlated with binary mask 𝑚 (see Figure 5.6b) to prevent 
false positive identification of zero bit as positive bit. Correlation results are then stored 
in list 𝐿𝑐𝑟. 
 
 
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.6: Standard deviation of transformed watermarked triangle (a) and correlation mask (b). 
The decision whether the corresponding bit is 1 or 0 is made based on statistics of 
correlation results, when median value from list 𝐿𝑐𝑟 is selected as threshold 𝑡ℎ 
determining the single bit value: 
 
𝑏𝑖 = {
1 𝐿𝑐𝑟(𝑖) ≥ 𝑡ℎ
0 𝐿𝑐𝑟(𝑖) < 𝑡ℎ
  5.7 
where 𝑖 is the i-th bit of watermark. 
 
The watermark is detected, if at least 83 bits of 120 bits is correctly detected. This 
reduction of required number of correctly detected bits of watermarks greatly improves 
detection. The 83 required bits is result of the false probability ratio computation 
according to the equations 3.1 and 3.2:  
 The false probability ratio of single watermark detection is 𝑷𝒇𝑾 = 1.62𝐸 −
05.  
 The false probability ratio in case of two same watermarks present in single 
image with total of 170 watermarks embedded is 𝑷𝒇𝑰 = 3.70𝐸 − 06. 
Therefore, this approach enables embedding of 270,270 unique watermarks (
1
 𝑷𝒇𝑰
). 
This can be considered as a great tradeoff between accuracy of detection, number of 
embedded bits and number of required unique keys. 
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Figure 5.7: Flowchart of the embedding process (left) and detection process (right). 
5.2 Frequency domain feature points 
As mentioned in section 5.1, use of geometrically invariant feature points exploits 
benefits of synchronization based techniques for robust invisible watermark embedding. 
This is advantageous, as risk of synchronization template being attacked is removed due 
to nature of feature points, whose removal greatly damages image. Another advantage of 
this approach is its content-awareness, because feature points are inherently dependent 
on the content of the image itself. This fact can be exploited by watermark embedding 
into close neighborhood of this feature points [10]. In order to make changes 
imperceptible, it is convenient to embed watermark in frequency domain. The discrete 
Fourier transform (DFT) is suitable for this task. For each feature point, a circular local 
characteristic region (LCR) of interest is selected. LCR’s are the transformed using DFT 
and watermark is then inserted in frequency domain of the area of interest. The inverse 
DFT follows to converted region back into spatial domain. After that, this new region 
replaces the old one. Because the same watermark is inserted into all regions, another 
level of robustness is obtained by this redundancy.  
5.2.1 Watermark embedding 
Watermark embedding consists of four steps: 
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 Robust feature points detection 
 Local characteristic regions selection 
 Watermark generation 
 Watermark embedding 
The flowchart of the process is illustrated in Figure 5.8. 
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Figure 5.8: Flowchart of the watermark embedding process. 
Feature points selection 
Because of the requirement for stability of feature points detection under various attacks 
such as affine transformations, perspective changes, noise reduction and addition or 
illumination changes, a MSER (maximal stable extremal regions) detector was chosen.  
MSER is a method for blob detection. Blob is a region in digital image with 
properties different to its surroundings. The difference could be brightness or color 
change. The blob itself groups points with approximately constant properties [29].  
The detection process works by sequential thresholding of image with all possible 
threshold values 𝑡. The pixels below threshold will have value of 0 (black) and values 
above threshold value of 1 (white). With rising value of threshold 𝑡, a set of images 𝐼𝑡 
would be produced. These images would start as white. Subsequently, black spots 
corresponding to local intensity minima would start appearing and grow. At same 
threshold 𝑡, some regions would start merging together. The last image in set would be 
entirely black.  
In many images, certain regions would stay the same for a large range of threshold 
values 𝑡. Those regions have following properties: 
 Invariance to affine transformations 
 Stability 
 Multi-scale detection 
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 Fast detection Ο(𝑛 log log 𝑛), where 𝑛 is the number of pixels in image 
To enumerate those extremal regions, following process is used: first, pixels are sorted 
by intensity. Then, the list of connected components is created. This produces a data 
structure storing the area of each connected component as a function of intensity. A merge 
of two components is viewed as termination of existence of the smaller one and an 
insertion of all pixels of the smaller component into the larger one. Finally, the thresholds 
producing MSER are selected as an intensity levels that are local minima. In the output, 
each MSER is represented by position of local intensity minimum and a threshold [29]. 
The final output of the MSER feature detector is a list of regions 𝑅, where each 
region is described as a list of points 𝑃 contained in this region with defined central pixel 
and size of the area. 
Then, filtration of detected feature points follows according to the process described 
in section 5.1. However, instead of the feature point response, the size of the detected 
regions is used to identify the best feature points. Also, the required distance of points is 
set to fixed value of 128 𝑝𝑥. This is due to the fact, that watermark is embedded into 
circular area with diameter of 128 𝑝𝑥 around the center of detected feature point. 
Local characteristic region selection 
As mentioned in previous section, the size of the area, where watermark is embedded is 
set to fixed size of 128 𝑝𝑥. This is convenient, as it ensures, that watermark is detectable 
even after image cropping. Therefore, the new set of LCRs 𝐿 is created by using detected 
and filtered regions as central points.  
Watermark generation 
Watermark 𝑊 is generated from the secret key 𝐾 using one-way hashing function. Its 
output is a pseudorandom sequence with length of 64 bits.  
Watermark embedding 
The watermark embedding process is done in frequency domain using discrete Fourier 
transform (DFT). Because the regions selected for watermark embedding are circular, and 
the DFT of circular regions is both difficult and computationally expensive, a zero 
padding of each circular area is made: an image of 𝑑 × 𝑑 is created, where 𝑑 is the 
diameter of the LCR circle. First, this image’s values are set to zero and then LCR data 
are copied into it. After this preprocessing step, the DFT of this image can take place to 
create transformed image 𝑇 (see Figure 5.9). 
The watermark is then embedded into amplitude spectrum. In order to make 
watermark imperceptible, a middle frequencies are selected. This is achieved by selection 
annular area between two circles with radius 𝑅1 and  𝑅2. The 𝑅1 = ⌈
3𝑅
8
⌉ and 𝑅2 = 𝑅1 +
32 ≤ ⌈
7𝑅
8
⌉. Then 𝐶(𝑟𝑖), 𝑖 = 1, … ,32 is the set of all homocentric circles around the zero 
frequency in the selected area. This approach enables successful detection even in case 
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of rotation, due to the majority criterion used in extraction. The watermark is then 
embedded into this area: one bit per circle. Then, for each starting point, another paired 
point is generated by negating the y coordinate: 
 {(𝑥𝑖
𝑝, 𝑦𝑖
𝑝), (𝑥𝑖
𝑝, −𝑦𝑖
𝑝)}, 𝑖 = 1, … ,32; 𝑝 = 1, … , 𝑛   5.8 
where 𝑖 is the number of bits of watermark and 𝑝 is the number of pairs in the circle 𝑐. 
 
    
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
Figure 5.9: The embedding process: LCR creation (a), zero-padding (b), amplitude spectrum of the DFT (c) and 
watermark embedded into amplitude spectrum (d). 
This causes that those points are 90 degrees apart on the circle (see Figure 5.10). 
The value of 90° was chosen due to the fact that magnitude spectrum of DFT is symmetric 
by its center and therefore modification of one half of the spectrum creates mirrored 
modification of spectrum in the other half during inverse DFT. However, because of the 
existence of only 32 homocentric circles (the 𝑅 = 64, due to the selected LCR size), 
which enables embedding of only 32 bits, the area for single bit embedding is reduced 
from 180 degrees to 90 degrees, thus 2 bits of watermark can be embedded per circle (see 
Figure 5.10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Schema of annular area selection from amplitude spectrum of DTF transformed image and pairs 
position: positions for embedding of first half of bits (blue), positions for embedding of second half of bits(red) and 
unused, but modified positions due to the amplitude spectrum symmetry (green). The white part is unused. 
𝑅1 
𝑅2 
(𝒙𝒊
𝒑, 𝒚𝒊
𝒑) 
(𝒙𝒊
𝒑, −𝒚𝒊
𝒑) 
𝑐 
 43 
 
Then, the embedding itself is achieved by satisfying following condition in each 
circle: 
 𝑀(𝑥𝑖
𝑝, 𝑦𝑖
𝑝) − 𝑀(𝑥𝑖
𝑝, −𝑦𝑖
𝑝) ≥ 𝛼 𝑖𝑓 𝑊𝑖 = 1
𝑀(𝑥𝑖
𝑝, 𝑦𝑖
𝑝) − 𝑀(𝑥𝑖
𝑝, −𝑦𝑖
𝑝) ≤ 𝛼 𝑖𝑓 𝑊𝑖 = 0
   5.9 
where 𝛼 is the watermark strength and 𝑀 is the magnitude of the coefficient at the location 
(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖). 
  
As a result, each bit of watermark is repeatedly embedded into corresponding quarter of 
each circle. This enables usage of majority criterion to extract single bit of watermark 
reliably. 
The watermark strength 𝛼 is determined automatically based on the local properties 
of each LCR: 
 
𝛼 =  𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ × 𝑠𝑢𝑚(𝑀) × 𝛽  5.10 
and 
 
𝛽 =
𝑏 − 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝐿𝐶𝑅)
𝑏
× 𝑐  5.11 
where 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ is the user defined strength factor, 𝑠𝑢𝑚(𝐼) is the sum of all image’s 
pixels values, 𝑀 is the amplitude spectrum of DFT, 𝑏 is the maximal possible value of 
pixel (255 for 8-bit images), 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝐼) is the mean value of LCR’s pixels in spatial domain 
and 𝑐 is the correction factor for current image’s color channel based on complement to 
the equation 5.2. 
 
The embedding process is executed on blue and red channel of image, because 
human visual system is less sensitive to blue and red colors. However, the detection is 
executed on all image channels, as during JPEG compression, changes in all channels 
occurs and watermark can became detectable also in green channel. 
Finally, the region is transformed into spatial domain using inverse DFT. However, 
before replacement of the watermarked regions with the ones in original image, the 
Gaussian noise of deviation equal to 4 and with mean of zero is added first. This step 
ensures that disturbances created by the modification of the LCR’s amplitude spectrum 
are less perceptible. Next, LCRs are replaced by images created by inverse DFT (only the 
circular area of size of LCR is selected and copied into new image, because the zero-
padding introduced prior to the embedding must be removed). Also, due to the 
modifications in amplitude spectrum, the resulting values can exceed the available range 
(8-bits). Therefore, due to the imperceptibility criteria, they are trimmed to the nearest 
available value. This ensures that no contrast changes are introduced to the local area. 
5.2.2 Watermark detection 
The detection process is similar to embedding process: The first three steps (feature points 
selection producing list of regions 𝑅, LCR generation producing list of LCRs 𝐿 and 
watermark 𝑊 generation) are all the same.  
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Then, the angular area is generated in the same manner as in watermark embedding 
scheme. From each circle 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶, a list 𝐿𝑖 containing group of bits 𝑖 of watermark ?̂? is 
extracted: 
 
?̂?𝑖
𝑝
= {
1 𝑀(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖) − 𝑀(𝑥𝑖, −𝑦𝑖) ≥ 0
0 𝑀(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖) − 𝑀(𝑥𝑖, −𝑦𝑖) < 0
   5.12 
where 𝑀 is the magnitude of the coefficient on at the location (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖). 
 
After the all the groups from the angular area are extracted. The real watermark 
values must be computed. This is achieved by usage of majority criterion, where 
membership to the group is examined: 
 
𝑑(1) =
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(1, ?̂?𝑖
𝑝
) 
𝑚𝑖
   5.13 
 
𝑑(0) =
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(0, ?̂?𝑖
𝑝
)
𝑚𝑖
  
 5.14 
where 𝑑(𝑥) is the ratio of 𝑥 against total number of items in set ?̂?𝒊
𝒑
 and 𝒎𝒊 is the total 
number of items in set ?̂?𝒊
𝒑
 (the count of point pairs for each circle 𝑐). 
 
The final value of the extracted watermark bit ?̂?𝑖 is then computed as: 
 
?̂?𝑖 = {
1 𝑑(1) ≥ 𝑑(0)
0 𝑑(1) < 𝑑(0)
   5.15 
The flowchart of the detection process can be seen in Figure 5.11. 
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Figure 5.11: Flowchart of the watermark extraction process. 
5.2.3 Variants of algorithm 
The proposed algorithm can support two operation modes: 
 Blind detection 
 Semi-blind detection 
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The blind detection is achieved using Reed-Solomon error correction algorithm 
[12]. For this reason, the amount of user-available data is reduced from 64 bits down to 
48 bits. The remaining 16 bits is used for error correction. This enables successful 
reconstruction of embedded data with up to 8 incorrectly detected bits. However, this 
error correcting mechanism also enables detection of incorrect data. Therefore, it is 
required to detect the same watermark at least twice to declare image as watermarked. 
Also, besides the detected watermark, the output of this method is provides confidentiality 
score of for detected watermark. This is computed as: 
 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓 =  
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑊, 𝐷)
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝐷)
  5.16 
where 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑥, 𝑦) is the count of variable 𝑥 in set 𝑦, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑧) is the size of set 𝑧, 𝑊 is the 
currently evaluated watermark and 𝐷 is the set of all detected watermarks. 
 The advantage of this method is besides the blind detection also absolute certainty 
that detected watermark is correct. However, it is for the price of reduction of user 
available storage size. 
 The second method uses statistics and false probability ratio according to the 
equations 3.1 and 3.2:  
 The false probability ratio of single watermark detection is 𝑃𝑓𝑊 = 1.22𝐸 − 05.  
 The false probability ratio in case of two same watermarks present in single 
image with total of 170 watermarks embedded is 𝑃𝑓𝐼 = 2.10𝐸 − 06. 
This enables reduction of requirement of correctly detected watermark’s bits from 64 to 
49. Therefore, this approach enables embedding of 454,545 unique watermarks. This can 
be considered as a great tradeoff between accuracy of detection, number of embedded 
bits and number of required unique keys. The advantage over blind detection is the 
possibility to embed more information with still good false probability ratio. 
5.3 Frequency domain tessellated feature points 
While method described in section 5.2 is robust against JPEG compression, pixel jittering 
or pixel skipping, it fails when affine transformations like shearing, rotation or scaling 
are introduced. On the other hand, the method in section 5.1 suffer from low 
imperceptibility, while robustness to affine transformations is achieved using Delaunay 
tessellation. In order to overcome those issues, a method combining the best of both 
method was developed. Therefore, properties of Delaunay triangulation (see section 
5.1.1), which is invariant to rotation and scaling operations are exploited to embed 
watermark in frequency domain into incircles of each triangle. 
5.3.1 Watermark embedding 
Watermark embedding consists of four steps: 
 Robust feature points detection and filtration 
 Local characteristic regions selection 
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 Watermark generation 
 Watermark embedding 
The flowchart of entire embedding process is illustrated in Figure 5.12. 
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Figure 5.12: Flowchart of watermark embedding process. 
Feature points selection and filtration 
Based on the experiences from methods in sections 5.1 and 5.2, an ORB detector [30] 
based on the FAST feature detector (see section 5.1) was chosen, as it is faster and 
provides than MSER and with almost same stability of detected points. The ORB detector 
internally uses the FAST detector. However, in order to improve stability of returned 
features under various affine transformations, this detection process is repeated under 
various scales of input image – the scale pyramid [31] is used. The scale factor of 𝑓 =
1.2 with 𝑛 = 8 scaling operations is used. Next, the stability score of each detected point 
for each scale is computed using Harris corner measurement [32]. ORB detector also 
provides descriptors, however, they are not needed in this work a therefore will not be 
described. 
After feature points extraction, their filtration follows according to the process 
described in section 5.1.1. However, due to the nature of watermark embedding, it is 
required that the distance between points is at least 350 𝑝𝑥. The choice of this value will 
be explained later in this section. 
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Local characteristics regions selection 
The local characteristics regions are created from Delaunay tessellation from detected 
points. For detailed explanation, see section 5.1.1. This ensures, that the generated 
triangles contains the same data even after affine transformations are performed on the 
original image (this is based on assumption, that the same feature points in previous step 
are also detected). Therefore, watermark detection is possible even for attacks like 
shearing, scaling or rotating. However, this time, the watermark is not embedded into 
generated triangles, but rather into their incircles. Therefore, the next step after triangles 
generation is computation of their incircles, which creates the set of LCRs. The 
computation of incircles includes both their size and point of origin. 
Watermark generation 
Watermark 𝑊 is generated using the same principle as in section 5.2.1 from the secret 
key 𝐾 using one-way hashing function. Its output is a pseudorandom sequence with length 
of 64 bits.  
Watermark embedding 
The watermark embedding process is similar to the one described in section 5.2.1 
– for each LCR, the DFT is performed on zero-padded image and amplitude spectrum 
modified. However, the modification is different, as it accounts for both rotation and 
scaling. This is achieved by embedding of bits into pie shaped areas instead of circles. 
However, the selection of embedding area is also constrained by selection of middle 
frequencies due to the imperceptibility requirement: the selected annular area is defined 
by two homocentric circles with radius 𝑅1 = ⌈
3𝑅
8
⌉ and 𝑅2 = ⌈
7𝑅
8
⌉. This area is then divided 
into pie like shaped areas (see Figure 5.13). Let 𝑛 be the count of embedding bits. Then 
𝑃(𝑖), 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 is the set of all pie shaped areas in angular area. Because embedding 
requires two areas to embed single bit (90 degrees apart, see section 5.2.1) and 
modification of only one half of amplitude spectrum is possible due to its symmetry, the 
width of each area is defined by angle of pie. Therefore, for each starting point, another 
paired point is generated by negating the y coordinate: 
 {(𝑥𝑖
𝑝, 𝑦𝑖
𝑝), (𝑥𝑖
𝑝, −𝑦𝑖
𝑝)}, 𝑖 = 1, … ,32; 𝑝 = 1, … , 𝑛   5.17 
where 𝑖 is the number of bits of watermark and 𝑝 is the number of pairs in the pie area 𝑃𝑖. 
 
The angle of pie area is computed using: 
 
𝛾 =
360
4𝑛
  5.18 
where 𝑛 is the count of embedded bits. 
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Figure 5.13: Schema of annular area selection from amplitude spectrum of DTF transformed image and pairs 
position: each bit is embedded into two pie shaped areas 90° apart (pair is on image illustrated by single color). The 
height of the area of single bit is defined by radius R1 and R2 and the height is defined by number of bits to embed. 
Remaining positions (left half of the annular area) are unused, however modified due to the amplitude spectrum 
symmetry. The white area is unused. 
 
In this case, the count of embedded bits is 64, therefore 𝜸 = 1.40625°. For this 
reason, the minimal distance of 350 𝑝𝑥 between feature points was chosen, as during 
triangulation it ensures that typical size of incircle is approximately 200 𝑝𝑥. However, 
this is not enough in all cases (see Figure 5.14), therefore also the minimum size of 
incircle is defined to 93 𝑝𝑥 (in circles smaller than this value, it is not possible to 
successfully embed and detect watermark, as it would require to embed multiple bits into 
single pixel).  
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.14: Illustration of possible cases of triangulation with minimum distance of points set to 350 px: feature 
points are equally distributed and resulting incircle is big (a) and feature points are not equally distributed and 
resulting incircle is small (b). 
However, the use of tessellation enables computation of rotation angle. This is 
possible due to the fact, that each triangle side can have different length. This is achieved 
by computing the angle between the longest side of the triangle and the horizontal plane. 
The point of their cross-section is the point of cross-section of triangle’s two longest sides. 
The computed angle is then used as an angle offset for the data embedding. 
Then, the process continues using the same principle as described in section 5.2.1: 
the embedding itself is achieved by satisfying following condition in each circle: 
𝑅1 
𝑅2 
𝑐 
𝑐 
(𝒙𝒊
𝒑, −𝒚𝒊
𝒑) 
(𝒙𝒊
𝒑, 𝒚𝒊
𝒑) 
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 𝑀(𝑥𝑖
𝑝, 𝑦𝑖
𝑝) − 𝑀(𝑥𝑖
𝑝, −𝑦𝑖
𝑝) ≥ 𝛼 𝑖𝑓 𝑊𝑖 = 1
𝑀(𝑥𝑖
𝑝, 𝑦𝑖
𝑝) − 𝑀(𝑥𝑖
𝑝, −𝑦𝑖
𝑝) ≤ 𝛼 𝑖𝑓 𝑊𝑖 = 0
   5.19 
where 𝛼 is the watermark strength and 𝑀 is the magnitude of the coefficient at the location 
(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖). 
As a result, each bit of watermark is repeatedly embedded into corresponding 
quarter of each circle. This enables usage of majority criterion to extract single bit of 
watermark reliably. The result of embedding can be seen in Figure 5.15. 
 
 
Figure 5.15: Modified amplitude spectrum of the DFT: right half of the image contains embedded watermark with 
angle compensation of 5 degrees. 
 
However, while the watermark strength 𝛼 is determined automatically based on the 
local properties of each LCR, it is achieved differently. In order to minimize 
perceptibility, it is computed for each bit separately: 
 
𝛼 =  𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ × 𝑠𝑢𝑚(𝑀𝑖) × 𝛽  5.20 
and 
 
𝛽 =
𝑏 − 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝐿𝐶𝑅)
𝑏
× 𝑐  5.21 
where 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ is the user defined strength factor, 𝑠𝑢𝑚(𝐼) is the sum of all 
image’s pixels values, 𝑀𝑖 is the part of amplitude spectrum of DFT, where embedding of 
bit 𝑖 will occure, 𝑏 is the maximal possible value of pixel (255 for 8-bit images), 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝐼) 
is the mean value of LCR’s pixels in spatial domain and 𝑐 is the correction factor for 
current image’s color channel based on complement to the equation 5.2. 
 
The embedding process is similarly to method presented in section 5.2 executed on 
blue and red channel of image, because human visual system is less sensitive to blue and 
red colors. However, the detection is executed on all image channels, as during JPEG 
compression, changes in all channels occurs and watermark can became detectable also 
in green channel. 
Finally, the region is transformed into spatial domain using inverse DFT. However, 
before replacement of the watermarked regions with the ones in original image, the 
Gaussian noise of deviation equal to 3 and with mean of zero is added first. This step 
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ensures that disturbances created by the modification of the LCR’s amplitude spectrum 
are less perceptible. Next, LCRs are replaced by images created by inverse DFT (only the 
circular area of size of LCR is selected and copied into new image, because the zero-
padding introduced prior to the embedding must be removed). Also, due to the 
modifications in amplitude spectrum, the resulting values can exceed the available range 
(8-bits). Therefore, due to the imperceptibility criteria, they are trimmed to the nearest 
available value. This ensures that no contrast changes are introduced to the local area. 
5.3.2 Watermark detection 
The detection process is similar to embedding process: The first three steps (feature points 
selection producing list of regions 𝑅, LCR generation producing list of LCRs 𝐿 and 
watermark 𝑊 generation) are all the same.  
Then, the angular area is generated in the same manner as in watermark embedding 
scheme. Likewise, the rotation angle is computed. Then, from each pie 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃, a list 𝐿𝑖 
containing group of bits 𝑖 of watermark ?̂? is extracted (the process is the same as in 
section 5.2.2): 
 
?̂?𝑖
𝑝
= {
1 𝑀(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖) − 𝑀(𝑥𝑖, −𝑦𝑖) ≥ 0
0 𝑀(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖) − 𝑀(𝑥𝑖, −𝑦𝑖) < 0
   5.22 
where 𝑀 is the magnitude of the coefficient on at the location (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖). 
 
Then, local and global decision follows. This is achieved using the same steps as in 
in section 5.2.2. The flowchart of the detection process can be seen in Figure 5.16. 
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Figure 5.16: Flowchart of the watermark extraction process. 
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5.3.3 Variants of algorithm 
Because the proposed algorithm is inspired by algorithm proposed in section 5.2.3, it can 
also support the same two operation modes (blind detection exploiting Reed-Solomon 
error correction and semi-blind detection exploiting possibility to set target false 
probability ration). 
5.4 Frequency domain feature points and tessellation 
The last proposed method is combination of two previous methods proposed in sections 
5.2 and 5.3. This is due to the fact, that while the first is not robust against scaling a robust 
against only against small rotation, the second does not have those issues. Instead, it is 
not robust against cropping a JPEG compression.  
Their combination is enabled by a fact, that the method described in section 5.3 
uses for watermark embedding incircles of triangles resulting from Delaunay tessellation 
an the area around the detected feature points itself is not used. Because the method 
described in section 5.2 does require only small area (circle with diameter of 128 𝑝𝑥), it 
is possible to embed the same watermark using this method without rewriting watermarks 
embedded by base method. The second benefit of combining those methods is the 
significantly higher count of embedded watermarks (nearly double) that is embedded by 
the base method. 
5.4.1 Watermark embedding 
Because the base method of this algorithm is method from section 5.3, it is basically 
whole used. The only difference is, that two different sets of LCRs exist – one containing 
incircles from base method and second containing LCRs of fixed size, generated from 
detected feature points using procedure as described in section 5.2.1. Both of those sets 
are processed using the method that generated the originally. Then, they all replaces their 
originals in noised image, which is created from original image by adding the Gaussian 
noise (see section 5.3.1). Similarly, blue and red channels of original image are used for 
watermark embedding, with weighting functions of respective methods. Also, the 
trimming after the image reconstruction using IDFT occurs in the same manner than in 
the base method. 
5.4.2 Watermark detection 
The watermark detection process is merges the used methods similarly like embedding 
process: two sets of LCRs are generated, each by one method and watermarks are 
detected. Then, global decision is made from common results. Likewise in previous two 
methods, the detection is executed on all image channels, as during JPEG compression, 
changes in all channels occurs and watermark can became detectable also in green 
channel. 
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5.4.3 Variants of algorithm 
Similarly to previous two proposed algorithms (sections and 5.2 and 5.3), this algorithm 
also support two operation modes (blind detection and semi-blind detection). This is due 
to the fact, that this algorithm is based on both methods and both methods have two 
variants. The detailed description of this operation modes is in section 5.2.3. 
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6 DIGITAL SIGNAL DATASET 
The digital data set was chosen to enable thorough testing and evaluation of both proposed 
algorithms and available software solutions for invisible watermarking of digital images. 
While the most common use of invisible watermarking is watermarking of photographs, 
other works like drawings or computer generated graphics are also suitable for invisible 
watermarking. For this reason, a four classes of total 100 high resolution color images 
were gathered.  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
Figure 6.1: Examples of images in dataset used for algorithms testing 
The first class contains photographs. They are divided into two subclasses: 
professional photographs edited with post processing software in order to maximize the 
visual impression of the viewer. They contains the various scenes from world around us:  
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clothes, fashion, food and drink, nature, sports, technology and urban architecture. This 
subclass of images was selected because of the presence of big areas created by single 
color or smooth colors transition, where low amount of edges is present. Also, the images 
often contains small clear foreground on blurred background. The set of images is 
gathered from [33] and images are licensed under Creative Commons Zero license, 
version 1.0 (CC0 1.0) [34], which allows free public copying, modification and 
distribution even for commercial purposes. 
The second subclass contains photographs created by amateur photographer with 
common digital camera. These images are characterized by higher additive random noise 
present in them and not so distinctive edges. They contains various scenes such as: 
architecture, nature or snow. The amount of smooth color transitions is greatly reduced 
against previous subclass. These photographs are created by the author of this work and 
are designated only for purposes of this work. Therefore copying, modification, 
redistribution and commercial usage are prohibited without author’s permission.  
The second class contains scanned drawings made by hand. They are characterized 
by low amount of additive noise and not so clear edges – due to usage of pencil, edges 
are grainy and looks noisy at the first sight. The color-filled areas suffer the same effect. 
However, because of their nature, a radically lower count of colors is used. This enables 
performance evaluation of watermarking robustness and imperceptibility in cases, where 
even slight changes in image are easily visible. The database is gathered from wallpapers 
freely available on NVIDIA’s website [35]. 
Third class is composed from computer-generated graphics. Based on the type of 
rendering, multiple subclasses of images are included: raytracing, in-game rasterization, 
cartoons and other, where are images massively modified by editing software, images 
containing fractal graphics and images created using texture mapping, bump mapping, 
isosurfaces and other advanced tools. This set is chosen because in some cases, computer 
graphics is sold similarly to photographs and therefore intellectual rights protection is 
required. Images from this set are also from NVIDIA’s wallpapers database [35], except 
for in-game screenshots, which are from following computer games: Crysis 1-3, Just 
Cause 2 and Witcher I-III. 
The fourth class of images is composed from testing images for monitor calibration. 
It contains images with color scales, checkboards, lines, and uniformly distributed 
patterns. The aim of this testing class is to study how proposed algorithms behaves when 
clear edges, big uniform areas and smoothly changing colors are present. These images 
selected from monitor testing set available at the faculty. 
The testing dataset is available at the enclosed DVD. 
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7 BASIC COMPARISON OF PROPOSED 
ALGORITHMS 
Based on the all variants of watermarking algorithms proposed in section 5, a total of 7 
algorithms is possible. For the brevity, they will be called by short names in the most of 
the testing section as follows: 
1. Tess.FAST.SemiBlind – for “Geometrically invariant tessellated feature points” 
method described in section 5.1. 
2. DFT.MSER.Blind – for “Frequency domain feature points” method described in 
section 5.2, variant enabling blind detection. 
3. DFT.MSER.SemiBlind – for “Frequency domain feature points” method 
described in section 5.2, variant enabling semi-blind detection. 
4. DFT.Tess.ORB.Blind – for “Frequency domain tessellated feature points” method 
described in section 5.35.2, variant enabling blind detection. 
5. DFT.Tess.ORB.SemiBlind – for “Frequency domain tessellated feature points” 
method described in section 5.35.2, variant enabling semi-blind detection. 
6. DFT.Tess+ORB.Blind – for “Frequency domain tessellated feature points and 
tessellation” method described in section 5.45.2, variant enabling blind detection. 
7. DFT.Tess+ORB.SemiBlind – for “Frequency domain tessellated feature points 
and tessellation” method described in section 5.45.2, variant enabling semi-blind 
detection. 
Because the properties of proposed methods slightly differs and it is easy to confuse 
them after the exhausting explanation in section 5, their brief comparison can be found in 
Table 7.1. 
7.1 Time complexity 
The time complexity of designed watermarking methods can be evaluated in two ways: 
the first one is estimate of theoretical time complexity that does not account for real 
processing time due to the hardware limitations. The second one is real time complexity 
that is measured on some hardware using model examples. However, both approaches 
should yield similar results in terms big O notation – both theoretical and real time 
complexity should have same type (e.g. logarithmic or polynomial). 
7.1.1 Theoretical time complexity 
In order to evaluate the theoretical time complexity of algorithm, the time complexity of 
the used subroutines must be evaluated first. The following list contains the most 
computationally expensive operations used in proposed algorithms: 
 Conversion to grayscale – 𝛰(𝑚𝑛) 
 MSER – 𝛰(𝑚𝑛 log log 𝑚𝑛)  
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 FAST – 𝛰(𝑚𝑛) 
 ORB – 𝛰(𝑜 𝑚𝑛) 
 Points filtration – 𝛰(𝑓2) 
 Delaunay tessellation – 𝛰(𝑘 log 𝑘) 
 DFT and inverse DFT– 𝛰(𝑚𝑛 log 𝑚𝑛) 
 Image warping – 𝛰(𝑚𝑛) 
 Coefficients modification – 𝛰(𝑙) 
 Deviation  – 𝛰(𝑚𝑛) 
where: 𝑚, 𝑛 are dimensions of image, f is the number of detected feature points, 𝑘 is the 
number of filtered feature points, 𝑜 is the number of pyramids (multi scale detection) and 
𝑙 is the count of modified pixels. 
 
Table 7.1: Brief comparison of proposed methods. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Domain Spatial Frequency 
Feature 
detector 
FAST MSER MSER ORB ORB ORB ORB 
Additional 
processing 
Tessel-
lation 
- - Tessellation 
Watermark 
capacity  
120 bits 48 bits 64 bits 48 bits 64 bits 48 bits 64 bits 
Resolution 18 bits 48 bits 19 bits 48 bits 19 bits 48 bits 19 bits 
False 
probability 
3.7E-6 1.8E-25 2.1E-6 1.8E-25 2.1E-6 1.8E-25 2.1E-6 
Detection 
type 
Semi-
blind 
Blind 
Semi-
blind 
Blind 
Semi-
blind 
Blind 
Semi-
blind 
Required 
detections 
2 
Speed Very fast Fast Normal Slow 
Theoretical 
time 
complexity 
𝛰(2𝑚𝑛 +
𝑓2 +
2𝑘𝑙(𝑖𝑗)  
𝛰(𝑚𝑛 + 𝑓2
+ 𝑚𝑛 log log 𝑚𝑛
+ 4𝑘𝑙(𝑖𝑗 log 𝑖𝑗)) 
𝛰(𝑚𝑛 + 𝑜 𝑚𝑛
+ 𝑓2
+ 4𝑘𝑙(𝑖𝑗 log 𝑖𝑗) 
𝛰(𝑚𝑛 + 𝑜 𝑚𝑛
+ 𝑓2
+ 8𝑘𝑙(𝑖𝑗 log 𝑖𝑗) 
Weakness JPEG, 
crop 
Scale, rotation, 
shear, blur 
JPEG, crop, 
shear, blur 
Shear, blur 
 
The cumulated complexity of algorithms (see Table 7.1) shows, that most important 
parameters are dimensions of image (𝑚, 𝑛), count of embedded watermarks (𝑘), and the 
size of LCR bounding rectangle (𝑖, 𝑗). However, while the size of bounding rectangle is 
relatively small, and at first sight the complexity of all algorithms can be simplified to 
𝛰(𝑚𝑛), this is not right approach, because when high count of feature points is found, 
the complexity of rounded part can easily overcome the number of operations by several 
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orders of magnitude: consider the DFT.MSER.SemiBlind algorithm and an input image 
of dimensions of 2 000 × 3 000 𝑝𝑥. For this algorithm 𝑖, 𝑗 = 128. The maximal 
theoretical count of filtered points is 366 (the minimum distance between two points is 
128 𝑝𝑥). The count of modified pixels in each amplitude is 4 024 (half of the annular 
area). Therefore, using the neglected part of complexity equation 4𝑘𝑙(𝑖𝑗 log 𝑖𝑗), the 
number of resulting operations is 4 × 366 × 4 024 × 16384 × 4 = 386 𝐵𝑂𝑃𝑆 (billions 
of operations), while the simplified complexity results in 0.006 𝐵𝑂𝑃𝑆. Further, even if 
the number of filtered points is reduced to the values common for the image of defined 
size (80), the count of required operations is still several orders of magnitude grater and 
should not neglected (84 𝐵𝑂𝑃𝑆 versus 0.006 𝐵𝑂𝑃𝑆). However, the same apply also for 
points filtering – the number of found feature points can be several tens of thousands and 
can easily overcome time complexity of 𝛰(𝑚𝑛): consider 𝑘 = 100 000. Then, filtering 
results into 100 𝐵𝑂𝑃𝑆 and becomes the second most expensive operation. 
7.1.2 Real time complexity 
The real time complexity was measured using synthetic testing, when data was embedded 
into image cropped to the desired resolution and feature points were created artificially. 
This was due to the fact, that when real images are used, the count of feature points is 
dependent on the image features, which would distort the measurement. For the 
measurement itself, the hardware listed in Table 7.2 was used. 
 
Table 7.2: Used hardware. 
Component Type Speed 
CPU Intel Q6600 3.21 GHz 
RAM DDR2 6 GB 1066 MHz 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Comparison of measured and estimated time complexity dependency of filtration on features points count. 
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Figure 7.2: Comparison of measured and estimated time complexity dependency of Delaunay's tessellation on feature 
points count. 
 
Figure 7.3: Comparison of measured and estimated time complexity dependency of feature points count on resulting 
processing time for DFT.MSER method. 
As can be seen in the Figure 7.1, Figure 7.2, Figure 7.3, Figure 7.4, Figure 7.5, 
Figure 7.6 and Figure 7.7, the time complexity estimations from section 7.1.1 were 
correct. However, in some cases, a slight deviation is present. Because the operation itself 
is short enough, this is caused mostly by the overhead (Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3). 
However, in case of DFT (Figure 7.7) the overhead for bigger image size is caused by the 
small CPU cache. Further, it can be seen that while the type of the complexity is the same 
as estimated, the actual execution time differs depending on the performed operation. 
This is due to the hardware itself, when some operations can be executed using single 
instruction and other require instruction chaining. 
In Figure 7.3, the complexity of DFT.MSER method is illustrated. It shows required 
time to embed different count of watermarks into image of dimensions of 4 608 ×
3456 𝑝𝑥. As expected, the whole process has nearly linear complexity. The reason is, 
that for larger count of feature points, the embedding process itself requires by several 
orders of magnitude more instructions than detection and preprocessing (see section 
7.1.1). 
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Figure 7.4: Comparison of measured and estimated time complexity dependency of FAST features detector over 
different image sizes. 
 
Figure 7.5: Comparison of measured and estimated time complexity dependency of ORB features detector over 
different image sizes. 
 
Figure 7.6: Comparison of the measured and estimated time complexity dependency of MSER features detector over 
different image sizes. 
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Figure 7.7: The comparison of measured and estimated time complexity dependency of DFT and IDFT on image size. 
7.2 Space complexity 
The space complexity of the proposed methods, likewise time complexity, can be 
evaluated in the theoretical and real level. However, in this case, the theoretical 
complexity will yield much lower memory requirements than real application, due to the 
additional information that are held in memory during the application runtime.  
7.2.1 Theoretical space complexity 
The theoretical space complexity does not show similar behavior like theoretical time 
complexity, because the algorithms does not require the allocation of all required memory 
at once, but rather it is allocated on demand. Therefore, it can be reused, which greatly 
reduces its required amount. The most memory consuming operations are those, which 
process the whole image – color conversion for feature points search, noise addition, and 
color channels modifications. Then, the watermark embedding itself has much lower 
memory requirements – only the small part of image is modified. Yet, multiple allocations 
of that size are required (e.g. DFT conversion requires higher precision than the input 
image contains, imaginary and real part are required). The last part of memory 
requirements are for other computations (e.g. orientation) and holders of information 
(feature points location) and can be neglected in comparison with requirements to store 
information about input image. Because the input image must be cloned in order to add 
noise to the unused parts and watermark is added into unnoised image, two allocations of 
image size are required. Then, as mentioned before, another memory is required for 
watermark embedding itself and other data storage. Therefore, the worst possible space 
complexity of proposed algorithms is at most 𝑂(𝑐𝑏3𝑚𝑛) where 𝑚, 𝑛 are the image 
dimensions, 𝑐 is the number of color channels and 𝑏 is the number of bits used to store 
single image pixel value for one color channel (8 for standard JPEG images) The number 
3 is the result of additional memory allocations described before. Therefore, the maximal 
theoretical usage of memory for watermark embedding into 16 𝑀𝑃𝑥 image is at most 
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1 152 𝑀𝑏 = 144 𝑀𝐵. The watermark detection itself is even less memory demanding – 
only 
2
3
 of watermark embedding memory requirements are required, as it is not necessary 
to hold the original image, only the examined areas. 
7.2.2 Real space complexity 
The real complexity of algorithms itself is very similar, but slightly higher than calculated 
theoretical space complexity. This is due to the used image processing library, which 
holds additional information about the images and performs additional checks whether it 
is possible to chosen operation on that type of input parameters. 
 However, the real application uses much higher amounts of memory, due to the 
holding of additional information, like original image, image with marked areas used for 
embedding or separated color channels with embedded watermark. Also, the user 
interface itself requires some memory allocations. Further the use of interop between two 
languages (C# and C++) requires to load the OpenCV library into memory. Therefore, 
the real memory usage of completely loaded application is about 500 𝑀𝐵 and during 
watermark embedding rises up to 1 400 𝑀𝐵. Yet, with the hardware of the currently used 
computers, this values can still be considered to be moderately demanding for memory. 
However, for use in mobile devices, it is possible to reduce the actual requirements 
closely to the theoretical computed values. 
7.3 Imperceptibility, capacity and robustness tradeoff 
As mentioned in section 2.3, the requirements of imperceptibility, capacity and the 
robustness of the embedded watermark are in contradiction. Therefore, the fine boundary 
between these three must be found in order to satisfy requirements. This chapter will 
evaluate the relationship of these properties. 
Because of the complexity of the measurement in this section, only the three images 
representing the most of the dataset were selected for testing. While it is only 3 % of 
images in set, it is enough to evaluate these criteria. They are shown in Figure 7.8.  
The first one, “Aladdin”, represents the hand-drawn class of images. The image 
contains mostly the shades of grey with low amount of other colors. Also, high amount 
of inherent noise is present due to the fact, that it was drawn using pencil on the paper 
sheet. 
The second one, “Bacteria”, represents the computer graphics class. It contains 
shaded background without sudden color changes. The foreground, on the contrary, 
contains high amount of color changes due to the presence of edges. The amount of noise 
in this image is relatively low. 
The third image, “Nature”, represents the class of real photographs recorded using 
camera. The image itself contains high amount of noise and edges. It is also split into 
foreground with clear edges and blurred background.  
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For the same complexity reason, the detection was performed on the watermarked 
image without attacking and after attacking using JPEG compression with Q = 50 % and 
rotation of 15 degrees. These two attacks were selected because of their ability to destroy 
embedded watermarks – they greatly shows the boundary whether the watermark is 
detectable or not. The selection of unattacked image models other attacks cases like blur 
and contrast and brightness changes. Here, the watermark is detectable under almost all 
strengths, the only change is in amount of detections.  
Because of the low range of possible strength level, only the extreme ones were 
together with the normal level were selected for testing: 0.5, 1.0 and 1.5 of the normal 
level. The higher strength level means lower imperceptibility. 
 
 
  
(a) Aladdin (b) Bacteria (c) Nature 
Figure 7.8: The images used for the measurement of the imperceptibility, capacity and robustness dependency. 
The imperceptibility of watermarks was evaluated using PSNR metrics described 
in section 2.3.3. The PSNR value of 30 dB and more can be considered as very good – 
the images are similar to the point, that for human it is hard to see the difference between 
original image and watermarked image. 
7.3.1 Imperceptibility versus robustness 
As mentioned before, the imperceptibility is directly influencing the robustness of the 
watermark. For this reason, it is important to select watermark strength level that is still 
imperceptible enough and is detectable under the most image modifications as possible. 
However, their relationship does not has to be linear – higher perceptibility does not 
necessary mean higher robustness. Therefore, thorough testing is required to find the 
balance between these two.  
The imperceptibility versus robustness test shown in Table 7.3, Table 7.4 and Table 
7.5 shows, that all methods produces acceptable PSNR values even for highest strength. 
Also, the PSNR values differs for the blind and semi-blind version of the same method. 
This due to the different data that are actually embedded – the blind method adds error 
correcting bits, while the semi-blind uses one-way hashing function. 
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Table 7.3: The dependency between imperceptibility and robustness for unattacked image. 
Method 
 Aladdin Bacteria Nature 
Factor 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 
1 
PSNR [dB] 40.8 33.3 30.1 42.35 36.0 32.4 42.1 34.7 31.1 
Detected 68/474 137/474 170/474 4/112 41/112 64/112 21/332 31/332 57/332 
2 
PSNR [dB] 38.8 37.6 35.8 37.5 36.2 34.2 36.7 34.7 32.1 
Detected 0/82 2/82 12/82 34/104 45/104 34/104 205/534 206/534 186/534 
3 
PSNR [dB] 38.6 37.4 35.6 37.3 35.9 33.7 36.4 34.3 31.6 
Detected 28/82 33/82 37/82 71/104 72/104 73/104 348/534 361/534 355/534 
4 
PSNR [dB] 42.6 42.5 42.4 41.6 40.8 39.8 41.2 38.4 35.9 
Detected 2/118 2/118 2/118 9/94 30/94 43/94 21/158 70/158 73/158 
5 
PSNR [dB] 42.4 42.4 42.3 41.6 40.8 39.8 40.9 37.9 35.3 
Detected 0/118 2/118 5/118 58/94 64/94 59/94 97/158 101/158 113/158 
6 
PSNR [dB] 43.0 39.6 37.0 41.3 38.9 37.0 41.7 38.1 36.7 
Detected 2/216 8/216 17/216 41/154 42/154 40/154 86/262 76/262 43/262 
7 
PSNR [dB] 42.6 39.6 37.1 41.3 39.1 37.0 41.6 38.9 36.5 
Detected 37/216 61/216 68/216 75/154 72/154 83/154 132/262 151/262 120/262 
 
Table 7.4: The dependency between imperceptibility and robustness for JPEG compressed image. 
Method 
 Aladdin Bacteria Nature 
Factor 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 
1 
PSNR [dB] 40.8 33.3 30.1 42.35 36.0 32.4 42.1 34.7 31.1 
Detected 0/474 3/474 1/474 0/112 2/112 2/112 0/332 0/332 8/332 
2 
PSNR [dB] 38.8 37.6 35.8 37.5 36.2 34.2 36.7 34.7 32.1 
Detected 0/82 2/82 3/82 0/104 0/104 0/104 0/534 0/534 10/534 
3 
PSNR [dB] 38.6 37.4 35.6 37.3 35.9 33.7 36.4 34.3 31.6 
Detected 0/82 0/82 0/82 0/104 6/104 14/104 5/534 38/534 135/534 
4 
PSNR [dB] 42.6 42.5 42.4 41.6 40.8 39.8 41.2 38.4 35.9 
Detected 0/118 0/118 2/118 0/94 0/94 0/94 0/158 0/158 0/158 
5 
PSNR [dB] 42.4 42.4 42.3 41.6 40.8 39.8 40.9 37.9 35.3 
Detected 0/118 0/118 0/118 0/94 0/94 0/94 0/158 2/158 14/158 
6 
PSNR [dB] 43.0 39.6 37.0 41.3 38.9 37.0 41.7 38.1 36.7 
Detected 3/216 3/216 3/216 0/154 0/154 0/154 0/262 0/262 0/262 
7 
PSNR [dB] 42.6 39.6 37.1 41.3 39.1 37.0 41.6 38.9 36.5 
Detected 0/216 2/216 6/216 0/154 4/154 17/154 3/262 20/262 35/262 
 
Table 7.5: The dependency between imperceptibility and robustness for rotated image. 
Method 
 Aladdin Bacteria Nature 
Factor 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 
1 
PSNR [dB] 40.8 33.3 30.1 42.35 36.0 32.4 42.1 34.7 31.1 
Detected 7/474 13/474 20/474 0/112 3/112 7/112 3/332 14/332 19/332 
2 
PSNR [dB] 38.8 37.6 35.8 37.5 36.2 34.2 36.7 34.7 32.1 
Detected 0/82 0/82 0/82 0/104 0/104 0/104 0/534 0/534 0/534 
3 
PSNR [dB] 38.6 37.4 35.6 37.3 35.9 33.7 36.4 34.3 31.6 
Detected 0/82 1/82 2/82 18/104 20/104 20/104 81/534 83/534 81/534 
4 
PSNR [dB] 42.6 42.5 42.4 41.6 40.8 39.8 41.2 38.4 35.9 
Detected 0/118 0/118 2/118 0/94 0/94 0/94 0/158 0/158 0/158 
5 
PSNR [dB] 42.4 42.4 42.3 41.6 40.8 39.8 40.9 37.9 35.3 
Detected 0/118 0/118 0/118 0/94 0/94 0/94 3/158 13/158 19/158 
6 
PSNR [dB] 43.0 39.6 37.0 41.3 38.9 37.0 41.7 38.1 36.7 
Detected 3/216 0/216 0/216 0/154 0/154 0/154 0/262 0/262 0/262 
7 
PSNR [dB] 42.6 39.6 37.1 41.3 39.1 37.0 41.6 38.9 36.5 
Detected 0/216 0/216 1/216 1/154 7/154 9/154 6/262 13/262 15/262 
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The results from Table 7.3 shows interesting pattern – for the methods 2, 3, 6 and 
7, the increase of strength factor does not produce better watermark readability, but, on 
the contrary – the amount of detected watermarks get saturated in-between strength factor 
0.5 and 1.0 and further increase does produce worse results. The reason behind this 
behavior can be too visible watermarks that causes desynchronization during detection 
(some of the most visible watermarks creates the feature points with better response that 
the feature points used for embedding). The second possibility is the saturation of 
modified amplitude coefficients during DFT reconstruction, which can alter the 
amplitude spectrum in a way, that it is no longer possible to detect watermark. All 
proposed algorithms based on DFT uses saturation of values exceeding the available 
range of image, because their normalization would cause contrast changes in the area. 
However, due to the fact, that PSNR does not reflect well local changes, a visual 
comparison was also performed. The results can be seen in Figure 7.9, Figure 7.10 and 
Figure 7.11. 
 
   
(a) Strength 0.5 (b) Strength 1.0 (c) Strength 1.5 
Figure 7.9: The visual comparison of watermark perceptibility for different strength levels using Tess.FAST method. 
  
 
   
(a) Strength 0.5 (b) Strength 1.0 (c) Strength 1.5 
Figure 7.10: The visual comparison of watermark perceptibility for different strength levels using DFT.MSER 
method. 
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(a) Strength 0.5 (b) Strength 1.0 (c) Strength 1.5 
Figure 7.11: The visual comparison of watermark perceptibility for different strength levels using DFT.Tess.ORB 
method. 
Because it is not possible to show all embedded watermark’s locations due to their 
count, only the most perceptible ones were selected. 
 As can be seen from listed figures, it is nearly impossible to see the embedding 
locations of strength levels of 0.5 and 1.0. However, the strength level of 1.5 is mostly 
visible under the zoom of 200 %. Therefore, based on the measured watermark robustness 
and the watermark perceptibility at the strength level of 1.0, this level can be considered 
as a gentle balance between these two. However, it is important to note, that while this 
strength level is generally good, the real watermark perceptibility depends much on image 
features and therefore in certain cases, it may be visible at strength level of 1.0. Therefore, 
the user should verify watermark perceptibility for each image. 
The other, also important thing is perceptibility of watermark in individual color 
channels of image. As can be seen from Figure 7.12, the watermarks embedded using the 
highest strength factor into blue channel of image are visible without problems. However, 
due to the human visual system, their perceptibility in color image is greatly reduced, as 
can be seen in Figure 7.9, Figure 7.10 and Figure 7.11. 
 
   
(a) Tess.FAST (b) DFT.MSER (c) DFT.Tess.ORB 
Figure 7.12: The visual comparison of watermarks for different methods in the blue channel of image for the strength 
factor of 1.5. 
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7.3.2 Capacity versus robustness 
For the comparison of capacity versus robustness, the proposed algorithms were modified 
in following way: 
 Algorithms with designed capacity of 64 bits were reduced to embed only 
32 and 16 bits. 
 Algorithms with designed capacity of 48 bits were reduced to embed only 
24 bits. 
 Algorithms with designed capacity of 120 bits were changed to embed 240 
and 60 bits.  
The capacity reduction for the DFT.MSER algorithms was achieved using 
embedding only one bit per circle in case of 32 bits and by reduction of used frequency 
range to half for 16 bits. For the semi-blind detection, the number of required correctly 
decoded bits is reduced to 27 for embedding of 32 bits. For embedding of 16 bits, all 16 
must be detected correctly. This is due to the low resolution of watermark, when further 
reduction would reduce the amount of available unique watermarks. As of blind detection 
variant, the same reduction principle is used for the bit embedding, because internally, 
the same amount of bits is embedded despite the fact, that user is only able to specify 24 
bits (the rest is used for error correction). In case of 16 embedded bits, no error correction 
is present and both variants have same results. 
The capacity reduction for the DFT.Tess.ORB was achieved by enlarging of the 
pie-shaped area angle – double for the 32 bits and quad for the 64 bits. The same is applied 
to the blind detection variant due to the error correction bits that are not user available. 
As of false probability ratio, the same principle is used as in previous method. 
The capacity change for the Tess.FAST algorithm was achieved by changing of the 
single bit size in the embedding mask to its double (12 × 12 𝑝𝑥), which reduced the 
capacity to the 28 bits and its half, which increased the capacity to the 496 bits. In order 
to preserve the defined false probability of 3.7𝐸 − 6, the required number of correctly 
detected bits was changed to 320 bits for 496 bit watermark and 25 bits for 28 bit 
watermark. 
The capacity/robustness tradeoff was tested using strength level 1.0. 
 
Table 7.6: The effect of the watermark capacity of the Tess.FAST method to the robustness. 
 Aladdin Bacteria Nature 
Bits 28 120 496 28 120 496 28 120 496 
PSNR [dB] 32.1 33.3 33.6 35.0 36.0 35.9 34.3 34.7 35.7 
Detected 51/474 137/474 132/474 10/112 41/112 44/112 13/332 31/332 71/332 
Detected JPEG 0/474 3/474 0/374 0/112 2/112 1/112 1/332 0/332 0/332 
Detected rotation 8/474 13/474 15/474 0/112 3/112 1/112 4/332 14/332 14/298 
 
The results of watermark capacity change for the Tess.FAST method (Table 7.6) 
shows that the increase of capacity results has almost no effect in detection reliability 
when compared with normal capacity of 120 bits – the detection reliability is roughly the 
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same. As of watermark capacity reduction to 28 bits – the watermark robustness is worse 
than in two previous cases.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that this method enables to embed great amount 
(almost ten times more than other proposed methods) of data without negative effect on 
the image being watermarked. 
 
Table 7.7: The effect of the watermark capacity to the robustness for the unattacked image. 
Method 
 Aladdin Bacteria Nature 
Bits 16 32 64 16 32 64 16 32 64 
2 
PSNR [dB] 38.7 37.6 37.6 37.5 36.2 36.2 36.7 34.6 34.7 
Detected 15/82 9/82 2/82 62/104 48/104 45/104 348/534 243/534 206/534 
3 
PSNR [dB] 38.7 37.4 37.4 37.5 35.9 35.9 36.7 34.3 34.3 
Detected 15/82 32/82 33/82 62/104 80/82 72/104 348/534 392/534 361/534 
4 
PSNR [dB] 41.4 42.2 42.5 34.6 38.7 40.8 28.1 33.8 38.4 
Detected 8/118 0/118 2/118 42/94 39/94 30/94 75/158 69/158 70/158 
5 
PSNR [dB] 41.4 42.1 42.4 34.6 38.6 40.8 28.1 33.2 37.9 
Detected 8/118 6/118 2/118 42/94 59/94 64/94 75/158 105/158 101/158 
6 
PSNR [dB] 41.6 39.6 39.6 38.1 38.6 38.9 33.1 37.1 38.1 
Detected 26/216 17/216 8/216 71/157 67/154 42/154 165/262 110/262 76/262 
7 
PSNR [dB] 41.6 41.7 39.6 38.1 40.0 39.1 33.1 37.4 38.9 
Detected 26/216 60/216 61/216 71/157 94/154 72/154 165/262 119/262 151/262 
 
Table 7.8: The effect of the watermark capacity to the robustness for the JPEG compressed image. 
Method 
 Aladdin Bacteria Nature 
Bits 16 32 64 16 32 64 16 32 64 
2 
PSNR [dB] 38.7 37.6 37.6 37.5 36.2 36.2 36.7 34.6 34.7 
Detected 2/82 0/82 2/82 3/104 0/104 0/104 41/348 4/534 0/534 
3 
PSNR [dB] 38.7 37.4 37.4 37.5 35.9 35.9 36.7 34.3 34.3 
Detected 2/82 0/82 0/82 3/104 3/104 6/104 41/348 46/534 38/534 
4 
PSNR [dB] 41.4 42.2 42.5 34.6 38.7 40.8 28.1 33.8 38.4 
Detected 0/118 0/118 0/118 0/94 0/94 0/94 27/158 2/158 0/158 
5 
PSNR [dB] 41.4 42.1 42.4 34.6 38.6 40.8 28.1 33.2 37.9 
Detected 0/118 0/118 0/118 0/94 0/94 0/94 27/158 19/158 2/158 
6 
PSNR [dB] 41.6 39.6 39.6 38.1 38.6 38.9 33.1 37.1 38.1 
Detected 0/216 0/216 3/216 5/154 0/154 0/154 38/262 2/262 0/262 
7 
PSNR [dB] 41.6 41.7 39.6 38.1 40.0 39.1 33.1 37.4 38.9 
Detected 0/216 4/216 2/216 5/154 3/154 4/154 38/262 20/262 20/262 
 
Table 7.9: The effect of the watermark capacity to the robustness for the rotated image. 
Method 
 Aladdin Bacteria Nature 
Bits 16 32 64 16 32 64 16 32 64 
2 
PSNR [dB] 38.7 37.6 37.6 37.5 36.2 36.2 36.7 34.6 34.7 
Detected 0/82 0/82 0/82 7/104 2/104 0/104 46/534 5/534 0/534 
3 
PSNR [dB] 38.7 37.4 37.4 37.5 35.9 35.9 36.7 34.3 34.3 
Detected 0/82 3/82 1/82 7/104 37/104 20/104 46/534 160/534 83/534 
4 
PSNR [dB] 41.4 42.2 42.5 34.6 38.7 40.8 28.1 33.8 38.4 
Detected 0/118 0/118 0/118 0/94 0/94 0/94 24/158 7/158 0/158 
5 
PSNR [dB] 41.4 42.1 42.4 34.6 38.6 40.8 28.1 33.2 37.9 
Detected 0/118 0/118 0/118 0/94 0/94 0/94 24/158 34/158 13/158 
6 
PSNR [dB] 41.6 39.6 39.6 38.1 38.6 38.9 33.1 37.1 38.1 
Detected 0/216 2/216 0/216 0/154 0/154 0/154 30/262 4/262 0/262 
7 
PSNR [dB] 41.6 41.7 39.6 38.1 40.0 39.1 33.1 37.4 38.9 
Detected 0/206 1/216 0/216 0/154 13/154 7/154 30/262 35/262 13/262 
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The results of measurement in Table 7.7, Table 7.8 and Table 7.9 shows that 
reduction of watermark capacity does have impact on robustness only in some cases: for 
the rotation attack, the number of successful 32 bit watermark detections was doubled 
over the 64 bit watermark. In other methods, the detection become successful. Therefore, 
if the watermark capacity is not primary concern, its capacity should be considered in 
order to improve robustness. 
7.3.3 Imperceptibility versus capacity 
The results of watermark capacity change for the Tess.FAST method (Table 7.6) 
shows that the increase of capacity results in better imperceptibility of watermark. When 
compared with normal capacity of 120 bits, the imperceptibility is better. However, the 
watermark is still perceptible. As of watermark capacity reduction to 28 bits – the 
watermark invisibility is worse than in two previous cases. This behavior is as expected, 
because the reduction of watermark size must inherently result into single bit embedding 
into bigger area. 
As can be seen from Table 7.7, Table 7.8 and Table 7.9, the impact of the watermark 
capacity change is in most cases none to minimal to the resulting value of PSNR. In 
DFT.MSER method it is caused by the modification of amplitude spectrum coefficients 
in homocentric circles. The reduction from 64 to 32 bits does not reduce the number of 
modified coefficients, therefore almost no change is present. Further, the next reduction 
from 32 to 16 bits does reduce the number of reduced coefficients and therefore the 
resulting PSNR value is better. 
However, in case of DFT.Tess.ORB method, the data are embedded into pie-shaped 
areas. Here, the reduction of watermark size does result into lower values of PSNR, which 
was confirmed also visually (see Figure 7.13). This is caused by the bigger area the single 
bit is embedded into. Yet, the resulting PSNR values are still within acceptable range.   
 
   
(a) 16 bit watermark (b) 32 bit watermark (c) 64 bit watermark 
Figure 7.13: Comparison of watermark perceptibility for different watermarks sizes using DFT.Tess.ORB method. 
In the case of DFT.Tess+ORB method, the resulting PSNR values are slightly better 
or worse after reduction of watermark size to 32 bits. This is due to the combination of 
two previous methods.  
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As can be seen from mentioned tables, the change of the resulting PSNR value 
depends not only on the watermark capacity, but also on the local characteristic of region, 
when the watermark is embedded. Therefore, it can be concluded, that the 
imperceptibility is influenced by the watermark size only in case of different number of 
modified amplitude coefficients. 
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8 EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION 
In order to compare proposed algorithms not only between each other, but also with 
existing available solutions presented in section 4, a testing framework was developed. 
At first, testing frameworks Stirmark [36], Optimark [37], Certimark [38], 
OpenWatermark [39]  and Checkmark [8] commonly used in other works were 
considered. However, the Checkmark, Certimark and OpenWatermark are discontinued, 
unavailable in both binary and source code and their websites are inaccessible. The two 
remaining – Stirmark and Optimark are not optimized for color images and have big 
performance issues when working with images of resolution over 2 MPx (this is due to 
their age, when they were developed in early 2000s). Therefore, a new testing framework 
was created using OpenCV library. 
8.1 Testing framework 
The used testing framework was implemented using OpenCV library [40] (version 3.1), 
its EmguCV interop for C# language [41] and Microsoft’s .NET framework 4.0 [42]. 
Therefore, it is supported by Windows platform on Windows XP and newer. The choice 
of this platform was determined by the fact, that proposed algorithms are also 
implemented using those frameworks, which enables easy integration. The frameworks 
uses lossless compression of PNG format [43] as a storage format for attacked images. 
This both saves required storage space and does not introduce errors of lossy 
compression. 
8.1.1 User interface 
The user interface is only graphical. This is due to the fact, that it enables user adjust the 
strength factor of watermark and test it on the image of choice. Interface then shows all 
possible locations for watermark and highlights the locations actually used (for 
embedding part) or locations where watermark was detected (for detection part). 
The user interface is divided into five parts: 
 Watermarking methods 
 Settings 
 Description 
 Single testing 
 Batch 
where the last two define two different operating modes. 
Watermarking methods 
This part of interface shows all available methods for testing. They are loaded 
dynamically during the program startup from the modules located in the subfolder 
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“/Methods”. Therefore, it is possible to add custom methods by simple adding of new 
module. The only requirement is to implement the defined interface (for the specification, 
see the APPENDIX B: Testing framework). 
Settings 
The each implemented method enables setting the watermark itself and watermark 
strength. The watermark is define as an ASCII string. Its length is automatically trimmed 
to the maximum possible length of embedding. For methods using semi-blind detection, 
the input string is converted into binary form using one-way hashing function. For 
methods using blind detection, the binary representation of the ASCII codes is used. 
Description 
Each method provides a brief description of exact process that is used to embed and 
decode watermark. 
Single testing 
This is the option suitable for testing of embedding strength, watermark perceptibility, 
effects of attacks and detection quality. It visualizes the results to user. Further, possibility 
to save each image channel is available. Also, it is possible to save image with marked 
embedding locations. The embedding, attacking and decoding is done separately. For 
each option, user is prompted to select the file, on which the operation should be 
performed. In case of attacking, the additional window for attacks selection is also shown.  
Batch 
Batch testing is designed for use with tested watermark settings. While it continuously 
visualizes the image currently being processed, as well as the current operation and 
filename, it does not allow user to save the channels or marked image like in the single 
testing section. The output of this method is saved into respective locations defined by 
the user. The output consist of attacked images themselves, and two .csv files: the first 
one, “embed.csv”, is created during embedding and contains information about 
processed files, the number of embedded watermarks and PSNR values between original 
image and image with watermark. The second one, “detection.csv”, is created during 
detection of attacked files and contains information if detection was successful, how 
many watermarks was detected, how many possible watermark locations was tested and 
also the path to the processed file. 
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Figure 8.1: Screenshot of the user interface. The shown image shows locations, where watermarks were embedded 
using selected method. 
8.1.2 Supported features 
The testing framework uses 16 classes of attacks in order to cover both common and 
malicious image modification. Their properties are shown in Table 8.1. As can be seen, 
some of the modifications (JPEG compression, shearing, noising and geometrical 
changes, pixel jittering) alters images in a way that the quality original information is 
either greatly reduced or completely destroyed. The others represent the common image 
manipulations that are commonly required (and performed) and therefore cannot be 
considered as an attack against watermark.  
The selection of attacks to perform is performed by the user using selection dialog. 
This selection dialog is shown either by clicking on the “Attack” button or on “Test” 
button. A total of 68 attacks from 16 classes is available. The addition of other attacks is 
currently not possible at the runtime as it requires the source code changes.  
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Table 8.1: Attacks supported in implemented testing framework. 
Example Name Description Versions 
 
JPEG 
compression 
Quality factor Q 
changes 
10% to 100% by 10% 
 
Rotation 
Rotation of image, 
bilinear interpolation, 
no changes of 
dimensions 
(exceeding parts are 
cropped) 
5, 10, 25, 45, 90 and 180 
degrees 
 
Scale 
Scale changes in X 
direction by factor fx 
and Y directrion by 
factor fy 
fx: 1.05, 0.95, 1.10, 0.90, 
1.30, 1.50, 0.50, 0.70, 
0.80, 1.00  
fy: 0.50, 0.70, 0.90, 0.95, 
1.00, 1.05, 1.10, 1.20, 
1.30, 1.50 
 
 
Gaussian 
noise 
Gaussian noise of 
standard deviation 
equal to the defined 
deviation with mean 
of zero 
Deviation: 3, 5, 10, 15, 
25, 40 
 
Sharpen 
Sharpening mask of 
size 𝑁 × 𝑁 
N: 3, 5, 7 
 
Blur 
Median blur with 
mask of size 𝑁 × 𝑁 
N: 3, 5, 7 
 
Shear 
Affine shearing, 
biliner interpolation 
1%, 3%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 
25% 
 
 
Pixel 
skipping 
Pseudorandom 
skipping of defined 
percentage of rows 
and collumns 
2%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 
20%, 30%, 40% 
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Histogram 
equalization 
for each 
color 
Brightness 
normalization in 
order to increase 
contrast 
 
 
Conversion 
to grayscale 
Conversion from 
RGB color space into 
gray color space 
using luminosity. 
Luminosity: 0.21𝑅 +
0.72𝐺 + 0.07𝐵 
 
Historgram 
equalization 
in grayscale 
Brightness 
normalization in 
order to increase 
contrast 
 
 
Contrast 
changes 
Intensity values 
multiplication by 
defined factor 
Factor: 0.4, 0.7, 1.3 and 
1.7 
 
Brightness 
changes 
Intensity values 
addition of defined 
level 
Level: -60, -30, +30 and 
+60 
 
Crop 
Cropping of sides, 
preserved central of 
defined size 
Size: 20%, 50% and 80% 
 
Barrel 
Image magnification 
decrease with 
distance from center 
Distortion 
matrix:
[
−4.18𝐸 − 5 5.07𝐸 − 5
0 0
] 
 
Pincunsion 
Image magnification 
increase with distance 
from center 
Distortion 
matrix:
[
−6.18𝐸 − 3 6.07𝐸 − 5
0 0
] 
 
8.2 Tests results 
The testing of proposed methods was performed on the gathered dataset from section 6. 
Also, the existing available solutions from section 4 were tested. However, the OpenStego 
software (see section 4.1.4) crashes unexpectedly with “java.lang.OutOfMemory” 
exception and therefore it was excluded from testing. Next, the Digimarc (see section 
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4.1.3) does not support batch processing. For this reason, the reduced dataset (subset of 
prepared testing dataset) containing 10 images, was created. 
 For the testing itself, only subset of available attacks was selected (the very similar 
attacks were excluded). 
 
Table 8.2: The color notation used in test results tables for clarity. 
Success rate 0 % – 49.9 % 50 % – 89.9 % 90 % – 100 % 
PSNR value 0 dB – 29.9 dB 30.0 dB – 39.9 dB 40.0 dB + 
 
 The test results tables uses color notation described in Table 8.2 for better clarity. 
Also, for the same reason, the performed attacks are grouped into three classes – common 
image processing operations, affine transformations and malicious image modifications. 
The results shown in this section will be for brevity reduced by the type of operation (for 
the measured data itself, see APPENDIX C: Measured data). 
8.2.1 Big dataset 
The robustness test results of proposed methods and existing available solutions 
(see Table 8.3, Table 8.4 and Table 8.5) on gathered dataset shows that proposed methods 
are generally comparable or even better than existing available solutions. However, when 
compared test by test, the result are not as solid. The three of proposed methods (1, 2 and 
3) are unable to embed watermark into 5 images. This is caused by the used detector that 
is unable to find required number of filtered points (the Delaunay triangulation requires 
three available points). Next, in some of images, the watermark strength is too low for 
successful detection. However, those values are set by the automatic process (described 
in section 5) in order to make watermark imperceptible. For this reasons, the proposed 
methods have disadvantage against the existing available solutions that embeds 
watermarks into all images without issues and can successfully read embedded 
watermarks from them.  
In case of common image manipulations (see Table 8.3), the performance of 
SignMyImage solution can be considered as poor and is outperformed by all proposed 
methods, except the methods 4 and 5, that are not designed to be robust against 
cropping operations and therefore are unable to detect the watermarks in this case. In 
case of JPEG compression, the results are more balanced and again methods 4 and 5 are 
less robust than SignMyImage. The most similar method to SignMyImage is the method 
2, which yields almost identical results, however, enables blind detection and therefore 
can be considered as superior. 
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Table 8.3: Results of robustness testing against common image processing operations for proposed methods and 
existing available solutions on gathered dataset. 
Method 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Icemark 
SignMy
Image 
Embedded 96 95 95 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Original 92 90 92 85 94 97 97 99 98 
Brightness -60 92 91 94 71 79 93 96 97 15 
Brightness +60 88 90 93 69 78 92 94 97 26 
Contrast 40% 49 89 91 78 89 98 97 100 2 
Contrast 160% 92 99 94 84 93 98 96 100 1 
Crop 20% 2 66 72 0 0 44 73 0 2 
Crop 50% 56 86 92 0 0 90 93 0 37 
Crop 80% 92 90 90 0 0 97 97 0 82 
Equalize histogram 8 97 91 95 43 97 93 100 2 
Equalize histogram color 91 93 94 81 93 98 98 100 4 
Grayscale 41 94 92 94 83 98 96 100 0 
JPEG Q=100% 90 91 93 64 85 95 97 100 87 
JPEG Q=90% 80 86 91 52 65 91 96 97 85 
JPEG Q=80% 69 77 89 38 49 85 94 96 78 
JPEG Q=70% 67 61 88 24 44 57 92 94 62 
JPEG Q=60% 56 38 89 28 30 39 92 87 36 
JPEG Q=50% 50 28 85 25 28 30 87 81 26 
JPEG Q=40% 39 19 78 27 15 29 78 77 10 
JPEG Q=30% 29 13 59 27 8 30 55 52 1 
 
The second existing solution tested is Icemark. This software shows far better 
robustness than SignMyImage with 100 % resistance against conversion into grayscale 
and histogram changes. Also, the resistance to contrast and brightness changes is almost 
100 %. Yet, this watermarking method is unable to handle image cropping. As of JPEG 
compression, the detection success degrades slowly with quality reduction, when 
watermark is successfully detected in 77 % of images even with JPEG quality factor of 
40 %. However, a high drop is present for quality factor of 30 %. When compared with 
proposed methods, it is better than methods 2, 4, 5 and 6. The methods 4 and 5 are worse 
in all cases and cannot be considered as an alternative. The methods 2 and 6 provides 
slightly worse performance, yet, they provide pretty good resistance to the cropping. Also, 
both enables the blind detection, which in some scenarios may be preferred and therefore 
even the worse performance acceptable.  
In case of method 1, the robustness is comparable, except for contrast reduction, 
histogram equalization and conversion into grayscale, where proposed methods success 
can be considered as poor (success is less than 50 %). Yet, it overcomes Icemark with 
resistance to cropping. As of JPEG resistance, the proposed method yield worse 
watermark detection success rate, but it can be considered as acceptable. 
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In case of methods 3 and 7, the robustness is similar. The method 7 is slightly better 
than method 3, as it is based on it and further combined with method 5. Both methods 
provides in most cases slightly worse success rate than Icemark. Partially, it is caused by 
the inability of method 3 to embed watermarks into all images and also by the automatic 
weighting that ensures imperceptibility, however, makes detection impossible for some 
images even when they are unmodified. Yet, the method 7 provides slightly better 
resistance against JPEG compression. The big advantage of both proposed methods is 
resistance to image cropping, where Icemark fails greatly. 
 
Table 8.4: Results of robustness testing against affine transformations operations for proposed methods and existing 
available solutions on gathered dataset. 
Method 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Icemark 
SignMy
Image 
Embedded 96 95 95 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Original 92 90 92 85 94 97 97 99 98 
Rotation 15° 89 0 89 38 55 34 88 0 0 
Rotation 35° 88 0 0 22 41 22 30 0 0 
Rotation 90° 89 0 0 0 0 20 27 0 0 
Rotation 180° 88 84 87 0 0 94 96 0 1 
Scale 50x50 68 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 61 
Scale 70x70 80 0 0 30 50 33 39 0 77 
Scale 80x100 86 0 4 9 0 37 0 0 74 
Scale 90x90 87 0 0 42 54 37 41 0 87 
Scale 95x95 90 8 0 52 72 43 50 0 86 
Scale 100x120 88 0 7 11 4 26 0 0 77 
Scale 105x105 88 7 0 51 70 44 48 0 88 
Scale 130x130 83 0 0 31 52 34 41 0 77 
Scale 150x150 71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49 
Shear 3% 91 29 88 24 37 10 91 0 10 
Shear 5% 88 0 80 7 6 15 77 0 4 
Shear 15% 82 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 
Shear 25% 69 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
The second group of affine transformation robustness tests from Table 8.4 shows 
far worse robustness than robustness against common image manipulations. Yet, the 
performance of SignMyImage improved when compared to other methods and Icemark 
does not provide no robustness whatsoever. The proposed methods 2 and 3, as expected, 
fails greatly. The only significant detection rate is in case of rotation by 180 degrees. This 
is also expected, as the method uses the DFT amplitude spectrum modifications, which is 
symmetric. The next significant detection rate is for the semi-blind method 3. Here, the 
presence of false probability ratio enables to successfully detect watermark in case of 
slight image transformations (shear by 3%). It can be expected, that it would behave 
similarly in case of slight scale changes (up to 2%) and rotation (up to 5 degrees). 
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In case of methods 4 and 5, the robustness against rotation and scale changes is 
present, as expected. Yet, it is not as good as expected. This is the result of high amount 
of embedded data, where as a consequence the single bit is embedded into too small area. 
As can be seen in section 7.3.3, the reduction of capacity brings the significantly better 
performance. Therefore, this variant of method should be considered when lower 
watermark capacity is sufficient.  
The methods 4, 5, 6 and 7 provides partial scale change resistance, but are not 
comparable to SignMyImage. Yet, they provide the robustness against rotation, which 
may in some cases outweigh lower success rate for rotation. The only method that is able 
to outperform the SignMyImage is the method 1. It is better in all cases even the only 92 
% of images contains successfully detectable watermark. It can be assumed, that if this 
issue was resolved. The performance would be even better. Also, this method provides 
balanced detection success rate over all tests with median success of 88 % and minimum 
of 68 %. Practically, it has no competitor except the 180 % rotation. 
 
Table 8.5: Results of robustness testing against malicious modifications for proposed methods and existing available 
solutions on gathered dataset. 
Method 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Icemark 
SignMy
Image 
Embedded 96 95 95 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Original 92 90 92 85 94 97 97 99 98 
Barrel 90 89 92 59 79 93 94 89 38 
Pincushion 84 49 74 20 19 38 64 1 8 
Blur 3x3 77 53 86 19 41 24 91 69 69 
Blur 5x5 36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 
Blur 7x7 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 
Sharpen 3x3 92 94 94 83 94 97 97 99 52 
Sharpen 5x5 92 94 94 80 93 97 97 99 34 
Sharpen 7x7 89 92 93 69 84 94 97 99 6 
Gaussian noise STD=5 92 92 92 98 94 97 97 100 4 
Gaussian noise STD=10 82 88 92 47 80 93 95 100 5 
Gaussian noise STD=15 60 86 93 35 66 93 94 100 2 
Gaussian noise STD=40 11 59 70 17 42 90 92 100 0 
Skip 2% 90 74 91 30 73 80 95 0 39 
Skip 5% 90 4 71 8 43 14 65 0 23 
Skip 15% 79 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 
Skip 40% 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
 
 The last group of test from Table 8.5 shows resistance against the malicious image 
modifications. Here, similarly to the common image modifications, the performance of 
SignMyImage can be considered as poor. Yet, it defeates all other methods except of 
method 1 in case of median blur of size 5 and 7. The performance of Icemark is fairly 
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good, but only for some of the attacks. In others (pixel skipping, pincushion and larger 
image blur) fails totally. 
 As for the robustness of proposed methods, their performance is pretty similar in 
case of image sharpening, and noise addition. The only exception is method 4, which 
shows significantly lower resistance. This is again result of the high amount of embedded 
information and improvement can be expected if the required amount of embedded data 
would be reduced. 
 Next, the blind detection methods 2 and 6 shows robustness to those attack that is 
comparable to the semi-blind methods. This is due to the nature of changes, where the 
modification of frequency spectrum are present mostly in high frequencies, which are not 
used by any of the proposed methods. The same apply also for image sharpening. 
 In case of pixel skipping, the success rate declines greatly. This is caused by big 
modification of frequency spectrum (the area around feature points changes) and feature 
points shift (new significant edges emerges) that results from this attack. Also, the 
presence of false probability ratio greatly improves detection rate for semi-blind methods. 
This is also valid for pixel jittering operations, especially pincushion. 
The problem of all proposed methods is image blurring, where only the combined 
semi-blind method provides great robustness. Yet, this is only valid for mask with size of 
3 pixels. In case of bigger mask, the proposed methods fails totally. 
The special case is method 1 that embeds watermark into spatial domain. It shows 
great robustness against both pixel skipping and pixel jittering operations and good 
robustness against blurring. In case of Gaussian noise addition, its performance is slightly 
lower than in case of other proposed methods (except method 4). Also, the robustness 
against image blurring is present, even though its performance cannot be considered to 
be good for blurring masks bigger than 3 pixels. 
8.2.2 Reduced dataset 
The same tests were also performed on the reduced set, as mentioned before, in order to 
compare robustness to Digimarc. The selection of images for this set was based on the 
test results of proposed methods over the complete dataset with the following 
methodology: 
 5 most problematic images: Aladdin, Bacteria, Balloon, Blocks, Leaf. 
 5 images with good results: Crysis, Forest, Mirage, Ribbon, Workplace. 
 All categories from dataset have at least one representant. 
This subsed was tested manually one by one using Photoshop CS6 (the Digimarc is only 
available as a plugin for Adobe Photoshop). 
 The robustness test result against common image modifications (Table 8.6) 
shows, that the Digimarc software has almost perfect detection reliability. The only 
exception is higher JPEG compression, where reliability slowly declines and conversion 
into grayscale, where the detections fails completely (the same apply for histogram 
equlization, which is applied to grayscale image). The comparable performance have 
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only the proposed method 7 and Icemark solution. While Icemark is only slightly worse 
in most cases (one missed detection), it is not robust against image cropping, when 
complete failure is present. The method 7 is lightly better (the JPEG compression of 
30% result into more watermark detection, yet, it is still a little bit worse than Digimarc. 
However, this method outperforms Icemark with resistance agains cropping and 
Digimarc with resistance against conversion into grayscale. Therefore, it can be 
considered as fair competitor. 
 
Table 8.6: Results of robustness testing against common image processing operations for proposed methods and 
existing available solutions on reduced dataset. 
Method 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Icemark 
SignMy
Image 
Digimarc 
Embedded 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Original 8 7 8 8 9 10 10 10 10 10 
Brightness -60 7 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 4 10 
Brightness +60 7 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 5 10 
Contrast 40% 2 8 8 8 7 10 10 10 2 10 
Contrast 160% 3 8 8 8 7 10 10 10 0 10 
Crop 20% 0 6 7 0 0 4 8 0 0 10 
Crop 50% 6 7 8 0 0 9 9 0 4 10 
Crop 80% 10 7 8 0 0 10 10 0 9 10 
Equalize histogram 0 7 8 4 5 10 10 10 0 0 
Equalize histogram 
colors 
8 8 8 8 8 10 10 10 1 10 
Grayscale 3 8 8 9 8 10 10 10 0 0 
JPEG Q=100% 8 8 9 6 8 10 10 10 10 10 
JPEG Q=90% 9 7 8 6 7 9 10 10 10 10 
JPEG Q=80% 8 6 8 5 5 8 10 10 10 10 
JPEG Q=70% 7 7 7 4 4 5 10 10 8 10 
JPEG Q=60% 6 6 8 4 2 5 8 9 4 9 
JPEG Q=50% 5 4 7 5 3 5 9 8 4 9 
JPEG Q=40% 3 3 7 3 3 5 7 8 1 8 
JPEG Q=30% 2 5 5 6 2 4 5 3 0 7 
 
As for the other methods, the method 6 (which is the blind version of method 7) is 
only slightly worse and in some cases can be preferred because of its ability to blindly 
detect watermark. The methods 1 to 5 have better overall robustness than SignMyImage, 
yet they do not have any advantage over method 7, Icemark or Digimarc. However, the 
space for improvement exists in methods 1 to 3, as they are no able to embed watermark 
into all images. 
In case of robustness against affine transformations, from the results (see Table 8.7) 
it is clear, that the proposed methods does not perform well on selected images. Yet, the 
Digimarc software does not have problem with it (except for image scale of different 
 81 
 
factors for x and y axis). Also, the shear operation is problematic. However, only the 
method one is able to withstand these modifications. Its performance is balanced over the 
whole range of operations, with 7 to 8 successful detections. Because it is only able to 
embed watermark into 9 of 10 images, while one of watermarked images is not detectable, 
it can be assumed, that after enhancement resolving those issues, it would be better than 
Digimarc, as it enables the detection even in case of scaling with different factors for each 
axis and is resistant to shearing operations. 
The other proposed methods (2 to 7) fails greatly on this reduced set and therefore 
are not suitable for watermarking. 
 
Table 8.7: Results of robustness testing against affine transformations for proposed methods and existing available 
solutions on reduced dataset. 
Method 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Icemark 
SignMy
Image 
Digimarc 
Embedded 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Original 8 7 8 8 9 10 10 10 10 10 
Rotation 15° 8 0 7 5 8 2 8 0 0 10 
Rotation 35° 8 0 0 1 4 1 4 0 0 10 
Rotation 90° 8 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 10 
Rotation 180° 8 7 8 8 8 10 10 0 0 10 
Scale 50x50 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 10 
Scale 70x70 7 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 10 10 
Scale 80x100 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 
Scale 90x90 8 0 0 6 6 3 7 0 10 10 
Scale 95x95 8 1 0 7 8 6 9 0 10 10 
Scale 100x120 8 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 9 0 
Scale 105x105 8 1 0 7 8 6 7 0 10 10 
Scale 130x130 8 0 0 0 7 3 6 0 9 10 
Scale 150x150 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 10 
Shear 3% 8 4 7 3 4 3 9 0 1 10 
Shear 5% 8 0 7 8 2 2 8 0 1 10 
Shear 15% 8 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 
Shear 25% 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
The last class of malicious modifications (see Table 8.8) shows similar, yet slightly 
better, performance to the robustness against affine transformations. Again, the Digimarc 
solution has almost perfect robustness (except skipping of 40% of pixels). The 
SignMyImage fails greatly and the Icemark resistance to blur and pixel skipping is almost 
none. Also, the pixel jittering in pincushion totally destroys the watermark. From the 
proposed methods, the methods 6 and 7 are comparable to Icemark (method 7 is slightly 
better, method 6 slightly worse, yet enables blind watermark detection). Method 7 is also 
comparable to Digimar, yet it does not bring any improvement and cannot be considered 
as a replacement. 
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The method 1 shows good resistance against pixel skipping, but this time fails 
greatly on both image blurring and Gaussian noise addition. It can be assumed, that even 
the proposed improvement of embedding would not make this method to outperform the 
Digimarc solution (method 1 shows better resistance to pixel skipping). 
As for other proposed methods, on this testing set, their performance is not good 
and probably cannot be much improved. 
 
Table 8.8: Results of robustness testing against malicious modifications for proposed methods and existing available 
solutions on reduced dataset. 
Method 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Icemark 
SignMy
Image 
Digimarc 
Embedded 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Original 8 7 8 8 9 10 10 10 10 10 
Barrel 8 7 9 7 9 9 9 9 3 9 
Blur 3x3 7 6 7 5 5 4 8 7 8 10 
Blur 5x5 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 10 
Blur 7x7 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 
Gaussian noise STD=5 10 8 8 8 9 10 10 10 2 10 
Gaussian noise 
STD=10 
7 8 8 5 8 10 10 10 2 10 
Gaussian noise 
STD=15 
4 8 9 3 6 9 9 10 1 10 
Gaussian noise 
STD=40 
2 6 7 0 0 0 9 10 0 10 
Pincushion 8 7 7 4 4 2 8 0 2 9 
Sharpen 3x3 9 7 8 9 9 10 10 10 6 10 
Sharpen 5x5 9 7 9 8 9 9 10 10 4 10 
Sharpen 7x7 8 7 9 8 8 9 10 10 1 10 
Skip 2% 8 7 9 4 7 8 10 0 7 10 
Skip 5% 8 0 7 1 6 1 6 0 4 10 
Skip 15% 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 10 
Skip 40% 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
 
8.2.3 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, the proposed methods were tested on two datasets and compared 
with three available watermarking solutions. Yet, only the robustness results were shown.  
However, because this thesis is about invisible watermarking, also the imperceptibility 
must be evaluated. Therefore, the PSNR metrics described in section 2.3.3 was used. As 
can be seen from results in Table 8.9. The proposed methods shows great overall PSNR 
values over 34 dB (from 30 dB up is the good similarity with imperceptible changes – see 
section 2.3.3), even the noise addition for watermark masking is used. The average 
imperceptibility is lowest in case of method 1 that uses spatial domain for watermarking. 
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This method also has the lowest and highest PSNR value from all proposed methods. Yet, 
the median value is also the worst one. Because the noise addition is not used, this average 
values can be considered to be on the edge of perceptibility and should be improved prior 
to the real life usage.  
 
Table 8.9: Resulting PSNR values for proposed methods and existing available solutions on gathered dataset; 
(*results measured on reduced dataset). 
Method 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Icemark 
SignMy
Image 
Digimarc
* 
PSNR [dB] 
min  
21.7 30.0 30.1 26.5 26.7 29.7 29.8 - 37.6 36.7 
PSNR [dB] 
max  
46.3 41.0 41.2 45.4 45.5 46.0 45.9 - 53.3 41.8 
PSNR [dB] 
average 
34.6 35.8 35.9 39.0 39.0 38.1 38.0 - 43.9 39.3 
PSNR [dB] 
median 
33.9 35.9 35.9 39.8 39.8 38.3 38.3 - 44.1 39.2 
 
The perceptibility of watermarks in other proposed methods is low and they are 
suitable for real life usage. However, as the robustness test has shown, their reliability has 
space for improvement and as can be seen from results in section 7.3.2, the reduction of 
embedded bits should be considered. 
The perceptibility test on large dataset of existing available solutions is only 
available for SignMyImage software. Its results show, that imperceptibility scores are 
much better than those of proposed methods. The PSNR values for Icemark are not 
available, because the used free version inserts besides the invisible watermark also big 
visible watermark. Therefore, the measurement would be greatly distorted. 
As for last software solution used for comparison – Digimarc – the results are only 
from reduced dataset (due to the unavailability of batch processing). The results shows, 
that the PSNR values are similar to those of proposed method, however their deviation is 
much lower. However, the direct comparison is not possible, as only part of the data was 
tested and therefore it is possible, that worse values of imperceptibility are also possible. 
 
Table 8.10: Comparison of count of embedded watermarks for proposed methods. 
Method 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Embedded max 1189 888 888 248 248 394 394 
Embedded median 316 122 122 130 130 231 231 
Embedded average 347 197 197 125 125 218 218 
 
The last thing that was not yet presented is the comparison of typical count of 
watermarks embedded by proposed method into images from testing set. As can be seen 
from Table 8.10. The most watermarks are embedded using the method 1. Then the 
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combined method (6 and 7) follows, however with the values lower almost by one third. 
The least watermark is embedded using method 4 and 5 (tessellation), where the typical 
count is about 130 watermarks. 
Therefore, when all information are available, the final verdict about the 
performance of proposed methods over the available solutions can be said: The Digimarc 
method shown great robustness and stays unbeaten. However, the proposed methods 1, 6 
and 7 are very close to it and therefore comparable. Based on the robustness dependency 
comparison over the data payload embedded (section 7.3), it can be assumed, that data 
reduction from 64 bits to 32 bits will result into better performance, similar to the 
Digimarc solution (Digimarc uses only 32 bits). The other two tested solutions (Icemark 
and SignMyImage) were outperformed by proposed methods by both resistance to the 
affine transformations (unsupported by Icemark) and common image modifications 
(weak point of SignMyImage). However, for the selection of invisible watermarking 
method for real life application, more information about the required detection mode and 
payload are required in order to select the watermarking method. 
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9 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The aim of this Master’s thesis was to introduce reader into the problem of invisible 
watermarking of digital signals and to the existing available software solutions. Then, to 
present multiple invisible watermarking methods based on different principles and 
perform thorough testing and comparison with existing available solutions on the 
gathered dataset. Firstly, the problem description was presented together with examples 
of situations, where invisible watermarking is needed. 
In the second chapter, terms and taxonomy used in the field were introduced. Also, 
flowchart of watermark embedding and decoding process was introduced together with 
formal description. Further, requirements for invisible digital watermarking were 
discussed and methodology for imperceptibility measurement was introduced.  
Third chapter presented current state of the art and areas, where the digital 
watermarking is used. Common approaches used for robust watermarking are also 
introduced. This includes the improvement of detection reliability, which can be achieved 
using the statistic and false probability ration setting or by error correction codes. 
Fourth chapter describes four existing available software solutions for invisible 
watermarking of digital images. Each one is thoroughly described and final summary 
table is also presented. Also pros and cons of each solution are discussed. 
The fifth chapter presents four different solutions for invisible watermarking of 
digital images. The first one – Geometrically invariant tessellated feature points (section 
5.1) is a hybrid method based on autosynchronization with enhancement of redundant 
information. The watermark itself is embedded in spatial domain and detection is 
achieved using correlation and statistics. It is designed to resist geometrical attacks and 
synchronization attacks (e.g. pixel jittering, affine transformations). It enables embedding 
of 120 bits of data and uses semi-blind detection. The big advantage is ability to radically 
enlarge the payload – the version enabling embedding of 496 bits was also tested. 
This method exploits content awareness, as watermark location depends on local 
features distribution within image. Local features are selected using enhanced FAST 
detector. After that, a triangular net is computed by Delaunay tessellation. Then, for 
watermark is embedded into each computed triangle. The detection step uses the same 
procedure – after local feature selection, Delaunay tessellation is computed and template 
is extracted from each triangle correlation and statistics of watermark template. Final 
decision whether image is watermarked is then made from all extracted templates – at 
least two positive detections are required.  
The second solution – Frequency domain feature points (section 5.2) – also uses 
redundant embedding and feature points – therefore it is also content aware. However, 
the watermark is embedded in the frequency domain. This algorithm exists in two 
versions – the blind with Reed-Solomon error correction with user capacity of 48 bits and 
the semi-blind version of capacity 64bits. The semi-blind version uses statistics to reduce 
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the number of bits required to detect correctly by computing false probability ratio. It is 
set to 2.1𝐸 − 6, which requires correct detection of 49 bits and produces final resolution 
of 19 bits.  
This algorithm uses MSER blob detector that is invariant against rotation and affine 
transformations. This is advantageous, because not only feature points are found, but also 
entire areas with similar properties, which ensures the stability of spatial area used for 
embedding. The watermark is then embedded into circular areas around central point of 
found areas using DFT. For this, middle frequencies are used in order to ensure 
imperceptibility and the bits itself are embedded into homocentric circles which ensures 
detection under slight angle changes. The parts of image that are unmodified are further 
noised in order to improve imperceptibility. Similar to previous method, the watermark 
must be detected at least twice in order to define image as watermarked. However, this 
method is not resistant against cropping operations. 
The third method – Frequency domain tessellated feature points (section 5.3) – also 
uses the DFT and amplitude spectrum modification. However, this time also the Delaunay 
tessellation is added for angle compensation (only incircles of triangles are watermarked) 
and watermark bits are embedded into pie-shaped areas in order to add robustness against 
scaling operations. The next change is feature points detector – this time ORB is used, 
which is enhanced version of FAST used in first method. This is in order to further 
improve stability and speed up detection against MSER detector. Also, the visual masking 
is improved to ensure better imperceptibility and detection. Similarly to previous method, 
two version based on same principle exists – blind and semi-blind – with the same 
capacity and resolution. 
 The fourth method – Frequency domain feature points and tessellation (section 5.4) 
– is combination of methods 2 and 3: the method 3 is taken as base method, but then the 
another set of watermarks is embedded into vertexes of triangles. This is enabled by the 
unused space around the vertexes. The aim of this method is to improve detection 
reliability and enable detection in case of cropped image. Similarly to the two previous 
methods, the blind and semi-blind variant exists. 
The sixth chapter presents creation of dataset for testing and evaluation of both 
proposed algorithms and proposed available software solutions. This dataset is composed 
of high resolution images of different classes: generated patterns for monitor calibration, 
computer graphics, hand drawn images and photographs. Each class is divided into 
multiple subcategories. The image content ranges from low color images (e.g. hand-
drawn) through images with low edge count (e.g. single small object on blurred 
background) for images with lots of edges (e.g. photographs of forest) A total of 100 
images is included in the testing set. 
The seventh chapter deals with the basic comparison of proposed methods. Besides 
their common design properties, also the time and space complexity is evaluated by both 
theoretical computation and real measurement. The measurements, as expected, 
corresponds to the theoretical values. The big issue however is the simplification of time 
complexity that can lead into incorrect results – the seemingly negligible operation of 
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DFT and IDFT has time consumption greater by orders of magnitude when repeated 
hundreds of times. 
In this chapter, also the influence of watermark strength to imperceptibility is 
evaluated. This, for its time complexity to test on full dataset and all attacks, is done on 
three selected images over the watermarked image, JPEG compressed image with quality 
factor of 50 % and rotated image by 15 degrees. The images were selected to represent 
the major image classes present in dataset and attacks by the most common operations 
that showed detection reliability problems in preliminary testing. The three watermark 
strengths were tested and were evaluated by number of detections in each image, the 
watermarks imperceptibility and visually. It was found, that depending on image content 
(the areas that are being watermarked) the detection reliability may not improve with 
higher levels of watermark strength (the success rate declined in several cases when the 
watermark strength was set to 150 % of standard value, in other cases the improvement 
in detection was nearly negligible). Next, the watermarks imperceptibility was inversely 
proportional to the watermark strength and setting of 150 % of watermark strength meant 
presence of mostly visible watermarks. 
Next, the effect of watermark capacity on robustness was tested. It was found, that 
in semi-blind DFT based methods, the reduction of capacity to 32 bits bring significant 
improvement in detection reliability. However, the effect of reduction to 16 bits is almost 
negligible. In case of the blind DFT based methods, only the reduction to 24 bit user 
capacity was tested with the same results as in case of semi-blind methods. However, the 
further reduction was not measured, as it would result in capacity that is not sufficient to 
embed meaningful amount of data. However, the capacity reduction in case of method 
that uses spatial domain does not bring any improvement – but rather the worse detection 
reliability. Interestingly, the increase of watermark capacity by more than four times, does 
not bring any significant change in detection reliability and therefore, this higher capacity 
can be used when needed. 
The last comparison evaluates the effect of watermark capacity over the 
imperceptibility. For methods based on circular areas modification in DFT, it was found 
that there is no measurable effect, as the same amount of amplitude coefficients is 
modified. However, for the method that use pie-shaped area, the reduction of capacity 
brings imperceptibility reduction. This is caused by the higher number of coefficients 
modified to the same value. In the case of method that uses spatial domain, the lower 
capacity means inherently lower imperceptibility, as bigger area is modified to embed 
single bit. 
The last, eight chapter introduces the testing framework used for measurement and 
performs robustness evaluation of all proposed methods over the prepared dataset 
together with some of the existing available solutions (the OpenStego solution was not 
measured, as it failed with exception for almost any image, the next – Digimarc – did not 
enable the batch testing, therefore was tested on reduced dataset). 
Results shows, that the Icemark solution has great detection reliability on the 
common image modifications (contrast, brightness and color changes), yet it fails greatly 
 88 
 
in case of image cropping and all affine transformations. In case of malicious image 
modifications, it shows great resistance against addition of Gaussian noise. With this in 
mind, all proposed methods are better. However, if we consider only operations that 
Icemark can resist, only the combined DFT method is better, especially the one using 
blind detection. Then, the method using spatial domain has comparable performance, and 
there is no doubt it is preferable if high capacity of watermark is required.  
The comparison with second solution – SignMyImage shows similar results. This 
solution has detection reliability problems with almost all attacks – none of performed 
test shows the detection reliability better than 87 %. Also, it is sensitive to color changes 
like brightness and contrast changes. However, it shows good resistance against all 
scaling operations, where it outperforms all proposed methods based on DFT. Yet, the 
proposed method based on spatial domain is still significantly better. Further, when 
overall robustness is considered, all proposed methods are better. 
The last compared solution is the Digimarc. Because it does not support batch 
processing, only the subset of 10 images was chosen for manual testing. The results 
shows, that Digimarc has great results and only has problems with conversion of image 
into grayscale and higher JPEG compression. From the proposed methods, none is better, 
yet both method based on spatial domain and combined DFT method are comparable. In 
case of spatial domain method, its robustness is lower mostly by 2 images, yet, this is 
issue of embedding, where the method fails to detect watermark in two of watermarked 
images. It can be assumed, that if this issue was resolved, the performance of this method 
would be the same as of the Digimarc solution. Further, this method enables to embed a 
significantly higher amount of data (120 bits vs 32 bits with possible upgrade to 496 bits). 
From the comparison of proposed methods, it is clear, that the DFT based combined 
methods yields better results (as expected from design) and therefore is preferable over 
the other. It shows great robustness even in case of blind detection. In case of semi-blind 
detection, the used false probability ratio enables to get even better results. Yet, the blind 
detection may be preferable in some cases. When compared with method based on spatial 
domain, the DFT versions shows better resistance against JPEG compression, which is 
probably the one of most valuable properties. However, the DFT methods does not 
respond well to image rotation and scaling operations, even though they were designed 
for this reason. This is, as mentioned, for the high capacity of 64 bits and tests shows, that 
this can be improved by reduction of capacity. 
The imperceptibility of proposed methods can be considered as good, with the 
median PSNR values better than 33 dB. However, in some cases, the PSNR drops down 
to almost 20 dB, which is not sufficient. Therefore, further research in this area (the visual 
weighing of watermarks) is required.  
To sum up, the proposed methods shows great robustness (especially the spatial 
domain based method and DFT combined method) against tested attacks when compared 
with other solutions. The only solution that remains unbeaten is the Digimarc software. 
However, the proposed methods provides higher available payload. Also, it can be 
assumed, that if it is possible to overcome the described issues (inability to detect 
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watermark in some of unattacked images), the proposed methods would be better choice 
(due to their higher capacity). 
As described in this section, all the items in the assignment were fulfilled. However, 
there are still areas in this field that requires further research (imperceptibility and 
robustness enhancements). Also, the feature points detectors reliability is not good 
enough in some cases and should be improved. One of possible continuations of this work 
is therefore enhancement of proposed methods and research of good feature points 
detector. Also, it may be suitable create method combining multiple watermarking 
approaches for further enhancement of robustness. For example to develop a classifier 
that is able to select the suitable watermarking method based on the content of different 
areas of image (e.g. spatial domain watermarking for large areas of single color like sky, 
DFT watermarking for areas with high amount of edges like grass). 
Next, the robustness against scaling and rotation requires improvements in case of 
DFT watermarking methods. One of possible solutions for rotation is to try to rotate the 
image by some small angle (e.g. 5 degrees) and try to detect watermark repeatedly. 
Also, the security of the proposed methods was not examined in this thesis, yet, it 
is important for real life use and should be tested. 
Further, the may be suitable to create watermarking method, that enables the real 
time detection of watermarked video sequences and can survive the digital to analog and  
back to digital conversion.
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APPENDIX A: COMPARISON OF CORNER 
DETECTORS 
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APPENDIX B: TESTING FRAMEWORK 
The testing framework is available on the enclosed DVD in the “Framework” folder. It 
is present in both binary form (x64) and source code. The source code contains project 
files for Visual Studio 2013. In order to compile, the binaries of EmguCV are required. 
For this reason, the used version 3.1.0.2282 is also enclosed (this includes the OpenCV 
binaries of version 3.1 required for runtime). 
The implemented framework also supports addition of custom watermarking 
methods. The requirements are: 
 One .NET assembly per method 
 Implementation of the “IWatermarking” interface defined in assembly 
“Infrastructure”. 
 Usage of the “Watermarking” namespace. 
 Usage of the class name “Core”. 
 Storage in the subfolder “/Methods” of the program. 
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APPENDIX C: MEASURED DATA 
The measured data itself contains about 40 000 entries. Because it is not suitable to list 
them in printed form, they are available on enclosed DVD in folder “Data”. 
 The data for each method are stored in separate excel files. The files containing 
data from robustness tests are named after the evaluated methods. Further, other files 
exists, where the overall performance is compared, false probability ratio is computed 
and time complexity evaluated. 
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